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ABSTRACT 
Federalism and Intergovernmental Relations (!GR) 
saturates the academic study and practice of public 
administration. The two are combined into a structure of 
government (federalism) and the flow of information and 
instructions within that structure (!GR). Forming a single 
and complex theoretical approach to public administration, 
they offer definition and clarification to the nature of 
American government. However, the approach is inherently 
biased - as currently offered. Deliberate or not, it 
stresses the supremacy of each level of government over 
lesser units - a clear hierarchical structure. A pyramid is 
often described with individual citizens as the foundation 
and national government leadership at the apex. 
This thesis offers another viewpoint and rebuffs the 
current trend. States are complex entities. Although they 
often act for the federal government, either as bureaucratic 
intermediaries or allies; states retain the capability and 
capacity to act independently. 
The thesis offers three frameworks to assess state 
operations. Two are familiar; the third is the basis of the 
thesis. Resting upon the nature of 'autonomy' and 
'intrusion,' the three help define relationships between the 
federal and state government. 
The first framework describes the state as a 
bureaucratic entity. States administer federal programs on 
behalf of, and under the oversight and review of, the 
national government. The second refers to the state as a 
federal government ally. The state has some autonomy to 
address its own concerns - yet remains junior to the federal 
government. The federal government still retains some 
authority over the state. 
The third framework goes beyond the focus upon the 
federal government. Rather, it sees the state as an 
autonomous actor pursuing its own interest. The federal 
government does not possess authority over the state and 
does not directly or indirectly influence state operations 
(e.g., financial aid). States establish, fund, operate, and 
oversee programs and projects without federal interference. 
Such state operations do exist. 
This thesis demonstrates the applicability of the third 
framework using the case study approach. The Division of 
Safety Inspection and Education (DSIE) of the Illinois 
Department of Labor (IDOL) is used to define and clarify the 
proposed framework. The federal counterpart is the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) under 
the US Department of Labor enacted under the Occupational 
Safety and Health Act of 1970. DSIE operates under the 
third framework. It is an autonomous operation - free of 
federal interference, intrusion, and oversight. DSIE is 
maintained and funded solely from state revenue. 
Although largely forgotten in the rush to focus upon 
the national government; states remain a critical level of 
government when meeting the needs and concerns of their 
constituents. States will take action alone and without 
federal involvement or assistance. States are still the 
first bastions for change and will continue to serve this 
function well into the future, a function they never lost. 
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Chapter 1: 
INTRODUCTION 
The theory of federalism and intergovernmental 
relations (IGR), as advocated by scholars such as Daniel J. 
Elazar (1984) and Deil S. Wright (1988) or drawing upon the 
works of other scholars such as David Osborne, is important 
in the study of public administration. 1 Federalism 
describes the structural organization of the different 
levels of government within the federal system. Elazar 
(1984, p. 2) defines federalism as "the mode of political 
organization that unites separate polities within an 
overarching political system by distributing power among 
general and constituent governments in a manner designed to 
protect the existence and authority of each." 
Intergovernmental- relations outlines the types and flows of 
communication and relations within and between levels of 
government. It is the central group of interactions or 
activities transpiring between the different types and 
levels of government (Wright, 1988). Combined, the two 
offer scholars a theoretical perspective about government 
structure and working relationships. 
contains a serious flaw. 
The theory, however, 
The conceptual nature of federalism/IGR is founded upon 
the relationship between the federal and state/local 
governments. The theory, whether intentional or not, 
1 
stresses the supremacy of each level of government over its 
lesser units (e.g., federal over state and state over 
local). The theory, consequently, is biased because it 
assumes a pyramidal arrangement with the federal government 
at the top. This causes confusion because of the normative 
bias it creates and the empirical misperception which 
results. 
A REVIEW OF THREE MAJOR WRITERS 
!GR is heavily dependent upon the structure of 
federalism. In federalism, the states are often portrayed 
as subordinates of the central federal government. The 
relationship between state and federal government is 
discussed in terms of the amount of autonomy the state 
retains. However much the proponents of federalism attempt 
to separate the power of the various levels of government, 
their case studies and explanations invariably portray a 
pyramidal arrangement. 
Daniel J. Elazar2 
Elazar's perception of federalism is one of federal, 
state, and local governments working together (sometimes 
with conflict) toward a common goal. Further, he sees the 
federal government responding to state desires (often 
2 
unstated) and compelling "errant" states to comply. Elazar 
views this arrangement as a partnership. Elazar (1984, p. 
2) defines "federalism" as: 
... the mode of political organization 
that unites separate polities within an 
overarching political system by 
distributing power among general and 
constituent governments in a manner 
designed to protect the existence and 
authority of both. 
However, Elazar's attempt to apply this to cases within 
his book, American Federalism; A View from the States (Third 
Edition) (1984), demonstrates the subordination of the 
states to the federal government. For example, his 
discussion of the issue of racial integration clearly shows 
a strong central government directing state action (1984, p. 
32-33): 
The 1964 Civil Rights Act was the 
turning point. It represented, in 
certain respects, a "treaty" between the 
states and the federal government 
providing for a formal reallocation of 
power. The representatives of the 
states "in Congress assembled" consented 
to federal use of its powers to backstop 
the efforts of those states willing to 
exercise power to maintain the rights of 
racial minorities - and to force the 
states unwilling to do so to comply with 
national constitutional standards. 
Elazar (1984) seems to perceive the Congress working on 
the behalf of the states in this passage. However, the 
members of Congress are not elected by state legislatures, 
but by citizens within the districts the Congress persons 
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represent. It is difficult to believe representatives of 
the states in opposition to forced compliance would support 
such measures. 
Congressional support is understandable when viewed as 
the consequence of political pressures and public concerns 
(e.g., special interest groups, public opinion, constituency 
votes, campaign financial support, and party platform). 
Political support determines the ability of elected 
officials, Senators and Representatives in this case, to 
remain in office. Elected officials who ignore these 
political realities risk their reelection to office. 
The outcry following the murder of three civil rights 
activists in Mississippi, deletion of voting restrictions 
(e.g., poll taxes) with subsequent increased black political 
participation, and the rise of public awareness, among other 
factors, led to a federal interventionist role. Busing and 
affirmative action both sprang from the federal court system 
and central federal government - not state action. However, 
Elazar's (1984) presentation erroneously leads the reader to 
believe the federal action was supported by the states 
through 'their' representatives in Congress. 
Other Elazar (1984) cases, such as the federal 
regulation of interstate commerce, similarly demonstrate the 
power of the federal government and the subordinate role of 
states. Although Elazar uses his cases to argue the 
presence of a federal/state partnership, another viewpoint 
4 
is discernible. In Elazar's (1984) case of interstate 
commerce, Congress gave authority to the states over 
nationwide transportation and industrial systems within 
state borders. The states were unable to effectively deal 
with the large interstate systems (e.g., railway) of the 
post-Civil War period, especially in the face of hostile 
rulings of the Supreme Court. The railroads, for example, 
would simply cut a state off from other states in 
retaliation while the Supreme Court followed a 
'constitutional dogmatism' limiting state power and favoring 
laissez-faire (Elazar, 1984). 
In a bureaucratic arrangement, however, the higher 
authority grants subordinate authorities additional powers 
to cope with new problems as they are encountered. This is 
an example of delegation of authority, an implied 
characteristic of the attributes of bureaucracy espoused by 
Max Weber (1958). Hummel (1977) points to the first and 
second bureaucracy attributes in which Weber (1958) declares 
the authority of subordinate bureaucratic levels is defined 
by rules and that there are levels of graded authority. 
Hummel (1977, p. 80) states, " ... hierarchy means the clear 
delegation of authority descending through a series of less 
and less powerful offices ... " The states, effectively, had 
little authority over the nineteenth century interstate 
systems until granted power by the federal government. This 
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is a different picture than the partnership described by 
Elazar (1984). 
Elazar's (1984) discussion of the impact of special 
interest groups fails to support his definition. If the 
states are viewed by the federal government as separate 
polities with autonomous powers over internal issues, 
Elazar's cases fail to convince. Elazar's examples of 
welfare reform and urban renewal are meant to demonstrate 
the partnership of federal and state government. He fails, 
however, to achieve his goal. Instead, he demonstrates how 
the federal government is used by special interests to force 
change upon the states and to provide these groups with 
increased power within state capitals. 
Special interest and reform groups, unable to force 
state governments to ''drastically enlarge" programs, turned 
to the federal government (Elazar, 1984, p. 40). "They 
turned to Washington for aid unobtainable from most of the 
states, hoping through Washington they would become powerful 
in their respective state capitals" (Elazar, 1984, p. 40). 
They succeeded. "Today the single-issue groups are trying 
the same tactic" (Elazar, 1984, p. 41). If states are not 
subordinate to the federal government, and are equals in a 
partnership (as Elazar frequently iterates), then his 
examples fail to support a partnership arrangement. His 
cases show clear federal supremacy and authority over the 
states - not partnerships. 
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Deil s. Wright 
Deil S. Wright, another prominent writer on 
!GR/Federalism, is similarly affected by the pyramidal 
viewpoint. Although Wright seemingly appears less 
constrained, he nonetheless presents !GR and federalism 
within the pyramid arrangement. Wright's book, 
Understanding Intergovernmental Relations (Third Edition) 
(1988), also discusses federalism as a partnership between 
the national and local governments. Wright traces the 
growth of !GR and federalism from the establishment of the 
United States through the early Reagan administration's 
years in office. He notes the federal government 
increasingly penetrates the realm of state responsibility 
through regulations, preemption, financial support and 
restrictions, cooptation, and professionalization of state 
administrative structures (Wright, 1988). 
The entire presentation rests upon the interaction of 
federal with state and local governments. These 
interactions largely seem to result from the use of federal 
authority to prescribe state administration of services, 
programs, and financial aid (Wright, 1988). Although not 
Wright's intent, a reader is led to believe a state is not 
an independent entity. Rather a state is part of a larger 
federal machine with some limited autonomy. This limited 
autonomy appears to exist in areas the federal government is 
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not prepared or willing to administer due to low or non-
existent political pressures. 
Wright (1988) informs us that federal intervention is 
probable if, (1) there appears to be a nation-wide problem, 
that is (2) not administered in the same manner from state 
to state, (3) has the support of strong special interests or 
the general populace, and (4) is politically advantageous. 
The elements used by the federal government to enact change 
range from influencing state decisions through financial 
incentives/disincentives to mandated compliance. This is 
not a partnership with equal participants; rather the 
federal government dominates the relationship. 
Wright's cases offer the reader relationships in which 
the federal government directs action or offers financial 
assistance to induce states to make changes. Non-compliance 
by states when federal action is directed is of ten 
accompanied by legal and/or criminal implications. Whether 
discussing urban renewal, welfare, highways, or hazardous 
waste disposal, Wright (1988) shows the federal government 
as the primary motivation for change. 
Additionally, Wright shows how the federal government 
becomes involved in state affairs through special interest 
groups and political pressures. His discussion of welfare, 
civil rights, and urban renewal clearly demonstrates the 
ability of special interests to directly approach the 
federal government to direct and institute programs within 
8 
states. In each case, special interests lobbied Washington 
D. c. to institute stronger programs than believed 
achievable within the individual states. Their approach to 
Washington D.C. enabled the interests to obtain programs 
cheaper than if they focused their attention upon the state 
capitals (Wright, 1988). 
David Osborne 
Osborne's book, Laboratories of Democracy (1990), is a 
study of how states are able to develop their economies. 
The theme Osborne proposes is one in which the states 
produce positive economic changes. The book gives the 
impression of the states forging economic change without the 
participation of the federal government. Osborne's book is 
an attempt to portray states as independent actors. 
Osborne's (1990) book is often cited by various writers 
who emphasize the role of states as laboratories. Osborne 
is frequently quoted by authors who cite his case studies 
to advance one aspect of the federal/state relationship. 
Osborne's principal line of discussion offers the idea of 
states as laboratories for applying new concepts and ideas. 
From these laboratories, the federal government may extract 
that which works to apply to national programs and policies. 
Osborne's book seems to imply the states perform these 
laboratory functions separate from the involvement of the 
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federal government. However, this is not substantiated by 
his cases. Federal grants were used by Massachusetts, 
California, Pennsylvania, and Arkansas to address areas of 
concern and to implement programs for positive change. For 
example, New York used federal funds to explore new concepts 
in low income housing, and Pennsylvania obtained federal 
assistance to pursue the Ben Franklin Partnership as an 
avenue for economic development (Osborne, 1990). 
The arguments and cases of Elazar (1984), Wright 
(1988), and Osborne (1990), reflect the limitations of the 
current federalism/IGR theory. The focus of Elazar and 
Wright were upon a strong central federal government 
operating within a weak state system. The states are 
portrayed as dependent upon the federal government for 
resources and direction. Osborne (1990) offers us a less 
constrained view of the states. States are able to develop 
new programs to meet the needs of their constituencies. 
Osborne's cases also demonstrate, however, the dependency of 
the states upon the federal government. The programs 
outlined in his book succeeded because of state use of 
federal resources. 
IGR AND FEDERALISM 
The theory of federalism and !GR depends upon two 
components, autonomy and federal intrusion, to categorize a 
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relationship between federal and state government(s). The 
two components, autonomy and federal intrusion, reflect the 
amount of control and influence the federal government 
exercises within a federal-state relationship. The 
applicability and validity of these elements, however, is 
limited to relationships within which the federal government 
is an active participant. Elazar (1984), Wright (1988), and 
Osborne (1990) use both elements to investigate and argue 
their cases. 
The elements of autonomy and federal intrusion are not 
carried to their full range of application. They are not 
used to assess situations where the federal government is 
absent and not a player in state programs. There is a 
continuum upon which the full range of autonomy and federal 
intrusion can be represented. 3 At one extreme, there is 
little or no state autonomy and federal intrusion permeates 
the state organization to the lowest level of operation. 
The states are essentially subordinates and functionaries of 
the federal government. States conducting autonomous 
operations without federal intrusion are at the other 
extreme. Federal government assistance, aid, guidance, 
requirements, oversight, and intrusion are absent. The 
state operates autonomously. Between the two extremes, 
states may be allies of the federal government. The states 
receive various types of assistance, financial and 
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technical, from the federal government. In return, the 
states pursue federal goals. 
Autonomy 
The first, autonomy, is advocated by Elazar (1984) and 
Wright (1988) in their discussions of federalism and !GR. 
Flawed as their cases are, the basic concept of autonomy is 
essentially correct. Autonomy is expressed in decision-
making capacities and policy implementation. It is, in its 
purest form and as relates to federalism/IGR, the ability to 
pursue a desired program or policy independent and separate 
of the federal government. Autonomy may be present, 
restricted, or absent. The degree and type of autonomy is 
key to the relationship between state and federal 
government. 
Almost every case presented by advocates of IGR and 
federalism (Elazar (1984), Wright and White (1984), 
Glendening and Reeves (1984), and Henig (1985)) assess 
autonomy using three criterion. These criterion establish 
the level of state autonomy within federalism/IGR; (1) 
financial structures, (2) regulatory requirements, and (3) 
administrative constraints. 
The first criteria is the existence of financial 
structures. Financial structures provide for financial 
support, in some measure, of the state by the federal 
12 
government. The assistance may be in the form of grants, 
aid programs, subsidies, revenue sharing, or other direct 
and indirect financial ties. The degree of financial 
control is expressed in the amount of slack a state has in 
the use of the federal purse. According to Wright (1988, p. 
201): 
The central intent of federal assistance 
is to alter the behavior, output, 
programs, or decisions of state and 
local governments. Indeed, federal 
assistance often attempts to prescribe 
within fairly narrow limits the choices 
exercised by state or local officials. 
The second criteria of autonomy is the nature of 
regulatory requirements. The federal government, as the 
central government, is generally said to possess preemptive 
authority over state/local governments. Federal authority 
has evolved into a complex and bewildering array of 
regulations over the daily conduct of state/local government 
and the lives of the citizenry. The regulations range from 
those associated with obtaining financial assistance through 
the control of programs. 
The amount of control the federal government exercises 
is often associated with the amount of latitude permitted 
the states within the structure of the governing regulations 
and law; the length of the federal leash. Wright (1988, p. 
22) explains: 
Federal agencies, 1:2y contracts and 
grants, attempt to promote and produce 
program results through third parties. 
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State and local governments [author's 
emphasis] represent nearly 80,000 
jurisdictional intermediaries, and state 
and local officials (both elected and 
appointed) constitute over 10 million 
individual intermediaries. Using these 
go-betweens, however, compels federal 
agencies to pursue administrative 
control strategies that emphasize 
regulation .Qy such means as attaching 
national policy objectives, mandates, or 
"strings" to grant programs [emphasis 
added]. 
The third autonomy criteria, administrative 
constraints, stresses the degree to which a state is 
permitted to address its concerns through legislative and 
bureaucratic action. Are the states permitted to change, 
define, delete, or increase the programs, regulations, and 
requirements of the federal government? How much oversight 
is there on the part of the federal government? How heavy 
is the hand that controls the purse and the leash? 
State and local officials act in an 
intergovernmental web in which the 
national government is the more visible 
partner. They continue to exercise 
great influence and discretion over how 
they utilize their influence. The 
decisions they make - even those garbed 
in the language of budgetary adjustment 
and bureaucratic reorganization are 
intensely political in the sense that 
they reflect conflicting interests among 
competing groups, and effect [sic] the 
distribution of power and resources 
among these groups. (Henig, 1985, p. vi) 
Although not always addressing the criterion of 
autonomy, most works on federalism and IGR refer to some 
aspect of the three. Whether it is concerning financial aid 
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to urban areas, regulatory requirements regarding welfare 
programs, or the procedures established by federal agencies 
to administer programs, autonomy criterion cannot be avoided. 
Generally, most authors seem to assume some measure of 
federal assistance and control. 
Federal Intrusion 
The second concept, federal intrusion, frequently 
overlaps autonomy, yet is distinctly different. Federal 
intrusion focuses upon the depth of federal activity into 
state operations and programs, rather than the structural 
focus of autonomy. Two criterion reveal the extent of 
federal intrusion. The first is information flow, 
categorized as horizontal or vertical. The nature of the 
information is closely tied to direction. Vertical flow is 
usually associated with formal communications and horizontal 
with informal communications. Communications which direct 
action are, by definition, formal communications. Directive 
communications requires a superior/subordinate relationship. 
Horizontal communications are normally associated with 
informal communications, but may include formal 
communications which are not directive. Federalism requires 
vertical communications. Although horizontal communications 
may exist, they are optional and not required for Federalism 
to operate. 
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The second criteria is the extent to which federal 
government assistance and regulations intrude into the 
decision-making capacities and operations of the state. The 
criteria assesses the degree to which federal influence 
permeates the state organization or program. 
Information flow, the first criteria and a component 
of IGR, looks at the types of communications and their 
movement within the structure of federalism/IGR. The flow 
is generally vertical, or directive, in nature for programs 
the federal government controls or provides assistance. 
Yet, this direction does not incorporate a multi-dimensional 
flow of information. Direction is essentially uni-
dimensional since the federal government dictates a desired 
action. Multi-dimensional, or informal, flows indicate a 
minimum of a two party discussion in which the participants 
are not subordinated to each other. Free and open 
communications are pursued, absent of one party's ability to 
enforce a desired action upon the others. The states and 
federal government are equals in a multi-dimensional flow. 
Wright (1984), and Glendening and Reeves (1984) 
describe the movement of information between layers of 
government as vertical and horizontal. They address 
horizontal movement as the informal exchange of information 
between professionals within a field or expertise. Informal 
IGR communications, unfortunately, seem restricted to 
specialized areas (e.g., environmentalists, engineers, and 
16 
health professionals). Federal regulatory requirements, 
regulations, and audits for example, are vertically 
directive by their very nature. However, not all 
inf orrnation exchanged between the states and the central 
federal government relates solely to formal IGR 
communications. Frequently, discussions on proposed 
regulations and congressional bills flow between state and 
federal agencies. 
Federalisrn/IGR scholars continue to view states as a 
level of government subordinate to the federal center. Even 
scholars attempting to address states as a means of 
development of new programs and initiatives, such as Osborne 
(1990), often fall into this mind set of federal 
predominance. Henig (1985, p. v) decried the scholarly 
focus: 
States and localities are not dull or 
insignificant, but they have been made 
to seem that way. University catalogues 
and academic journals show a growing 
interest in the broadly defined field of 
public policy. All too often, however, 
the interesting and controversial policy 
issues are interpreted as corning under 
the more or less exclusive purview of 
the national government. During the 
1960s and early 1970s, cities, in 
particular, were seen as the 
battleground on which existing issues 
having to do with race.and class 
conflict were being resolved. 
Textbooks, today, however, give the 
impression that state and local 
government involves little more than 
balancing revenues against expenditures 
[emphasis added]. 
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Common to f ederalism/IGR casework are passages 
acknowledging the federal government as a contributor, if 
not the sole contributor, of assistance (e.g., funds) 
necessary to begin or accomplish a major state program. The 
states studied by Osborne (1990) achieved their success 
through the contributions of the federal government. 
Grants, loans, and other financial instruments, were either 
directly provided or backed by the federal government. 
Certainly, the federal government's regulations and 
requirements were involved if federal funds were used. This 
is the second criteria of intrusion. It looks at the 
extent to which federal financial assistance and regulations 
intrude upon the decision-making capacities of a state 
program. 
The degree of intrusion of the federal government into 
the routine operation of state and local governments is 
extensive. The influence of the federal government often 
permeates programs at the lowest levels of program 
management. Glendening and Reeves (1984, p. 74) relate in 
their book, Pragmatic Federalism; An Intergovernmental View 
of American Government: 
Because of the greater specialization of 
categorical grant programs and their 
broader functional spread, as well as 
the increasing national tendency to 
regulate activities of the state and 
local governments, the federal influence 
penetrates deeper into state 
administration. 
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The federal government provides grants and program aid 
often critically necessary for the states to pursue programs 
and projects, even new ideas. Often, this 'assistance' is 
accompanied by guidelines on how the support may and may not 
be used. Reports and audits are not uncommon, even for the 
most liberal support. Glendening and Reeves (1984, p. 79) 
address this issue: 
Regulations attached to grants may 
require planning, establish accounting 
and auditing standards, prescribe 
administrative procedures, or set out 
performance standards, among a host of 
other things. Each program has its 
unique set of conditions, often referred 
to as vertical conditions, with which 
state and local governments must comply 
to receive federal funds. 
THREE FRAMEWORKS 
Federalism/IGR theory currently offers two views, or 
frameworks, of federal-state relationships. The first looks 
at the state as a bureaucratic layer within a federal 
hierarchy. The state performs as a functionary for the 
federal government. The second framework observes the state 
as an ally of the federal government. The state-federal 
relationship is a partnership, although the state remains a 
junior partner. This thesis offers a third framework. 
Federalism/IGR theory, as currently documented and 
portrayed, fails to address cases in which states pursue 
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their own interests separate from any federal entanglement. 
specifically, it fails to discuss those programs and 
projects states establish and operate without federal funds, 
oversight, or direction to perform. The Constitution of the 
United States promotes the authority of the individual 
states to address the concerns and welfare of their 
citizens. This authority, outlined in the Tenth Amendment, 
often comes into conflict with the Federal Supremacy Clause 
of the Constitution's Article Six. Article Six grants the 
federal government preemptive authority over state 
constitutions and laws. Confusion between interpretations 
and division of authority are prevalent among scholars, 
government officials, and the general public (Wright, 1988 
and Glendening and Reeves, 1984). However, the growth 
towards a powerful and centralized government overshadows 
the ability of the states to operate independently of the 
federal government. 
The national government has become the 
dominant partner - legally, financially, 
and programmatically - under the federal 
arrangement; nevertheless, states still 
retain important political powers and 
governmental functions that make them a 
necessary part of the partnership. 
(Glendening and Reeves, 1984, p. 63) 
Today, the average citizen looks toward the massive and 
complex federal power to address his or her individual 
needs. This often means the unacknowledged rejection of a 
level of government, by the general public and scholars 
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alike, that is frequently the better choice to address 
problems and concerns, the state. 
The State as a Bureaucratic Layer 
The current literature on federalism and !GR portrays 
states essentially within two frameworks. The first 
framework views the state as a bureaucratic layer. Here, 
the state is a formal part of the bureaucratic chain 
reaching from the individual citizen to the three branches 
of the federal government, and back to the citizen. The 
state is seen as an 'arm' of the federal government. Many 
of the programs usually associated with the state or local 
governments are, in reality, extensions of federal 
government activities (Anton, 1989). The state and local 
governments are acting as federal government proxies. 
State governments operating as bureaucratic extensions 
of the federal government are strictly bound to perform in 
prescribed ways with little or no discretion. The federal 
government's concern is that the "national legislative and 
executive will is not thwarted" by the state and local 
governments administering federal programs (Goggin et al, 
1990, p. 76). 4 Federal program administrators use a variety 
of instruments to advance their aims and enforce compliance 
by the lower levels of government, such as partial and full 
preemption, "appropriations, moral suasion, technical 
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assistance, loans, standard operating procedures, 
regulations, and penalties" (Goggin, et al, 1990, p. 76). 
Within the bureaucratic framework, a state is provided 
the funds and program to operate, but permitted little 
autonomy. Often, the amount of funds offered to the states 
is less than the program requires to operate. This 
viewpoint is frequently expressed in writings on regulatory 
federalism. The federal government gains at the expense of 
the states under this framework and relationship. 
Glendening and Reeves (1984, p. 83) provide a clear picture 
of this approach: 
Prescription and compulsion have 
replaced the negotiation that previously 
was the prevailing norm in national-
state relations. Furthermore, the use 
of states as enforcers of national rules 
and goals is a cheap way of evidencing 
Congressional support for certain 
problems ... In addition, the use of 
states as enforcers of national policies 
is an inexpensive way for the national 
government to regulate in terms of both 
finances and political costs. State, 
rather than federal, employees are used 
to administer the regulations, thus 
avoiding the political and financial 
costs of a larger bureaucracy and 
leaving the states with the onus of 
being the regulator. 
Until 1965, regulatory compliance was encouraged by 
federal agencies through the use of additional funds as 
enticements and/or by the threat of discontinued federal aid 
for a particular program (Glendening and Reeves, 1984). 
Congress changed tactics starting with the Highway 
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Beautification Act of 1965 by withholding funds allocated to 
other grant programs. As a result, other federal programs 
of assistance included the same type of provision. "For 
instance, the Energy Conservation Act of 1974, in an attempt 
to cut fuel consumption, prohibited the Secretary of 
Transportation from approving any [authors' emphasis] 
highway construction of projects in states with speed limits 
in excess of 55 miles per hour" (Glendening and Reeves, 
1984, p. 80). The Health Planning and Resources Act was the 
apex of this movement. It forces states to participate in 
health planning or face the loss of federal funds for not 
only the act itself, but 41 other health assistance programs 
as well (Glendening and Reeves, 1984). 
States may not have the choice of whether or not to 
participate. Even if they were to decide to risk the loss 
of federal funds, some federal programs can not be avoided 
(e.g., Civil Rights). The federal government may simply 
coopt the states. This is a change from the previous 
historical cooperative relationship between the states and 
the federal government. 
The State as a Federal Ally 
The state as an ally to the federal government is the 
second common framework of federalism/IGR. The state is 
provided broad guidelines and considerable room for 
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interpretation. Assistance is also provided, but the 
federal government oversight is usually relaxed. The 
alliance between the states and the federal government, 
however, is built upon a firm knowledge of federal 
preeminence. Anton (1989) argues that local officials fully 
understand the ability of the federal government to direct 
action and to control their behavior. Although federal 
courts may intervene to define limits to the federal 
government's "coercive authority," there remains the 
knowledge of the "legally coercive reality" of the federal 
government's power (Anton, 1989, p. 210). 
Most block grants, aid programs, and revenue sharing 
programs fall within the second framework. The state is not 
independent of the federal government. The elaborate system 
of grants-in-aid is used by the federal government to induce 
the state and local governments to accomplish the desires of 
Washington (Berkley, 1984). The corresponding 
administrative and regulatory requirements establish limits 
to state and local government actions. 
Although states are portrayed as partners to the 
federal government, they remain junior partners in the 
relationship. The federal government still dictates how 
funds are obtained, how they will be used, what the 
restrictions and requirements are, and what administrative 
controls must exist. The states are free to pursue their 
own agendas provided the federal agenda is fulfilled. 
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California is free to pursue its environmental activist 
programs provided the federal Environmental Protection 
Agency requirements are met first. 
The State as an Autonomous Entity 
I offer a third framework, the state as an autonomous 
entity. The state, in this descriptive model, pursues its 
own interests separately from the federal government. 
Federal funds are not used, federal regulations do not 
require state action, and the federal government does not 
possess oversight authority. The state elects to establish, 
fund, operate, and oversee programs and projects without 
federal interference. Such state operations do exist (e.g., 
Illinois' Division of Safety Inspection and Education). 
Unfortunately, scholars and citizens alike no longer 
see the state as a functioning and autonomous level of 
government. They believe the federal government has become 
the preeminent power and the states and local governments 
are now only functionaries of Washington. Henig (1985, p. 
2) discusses this perception: 
Some citizens and some scholars have 
concluded that the national government 
has effectively elbowed the states and 
localities aside - leaving them to 
occupy themselves with carrying out 
federal policies and allowing them power 
only in the sphere of the trivial and 
mundane. This perceived nationalization 
of significant decision-making functions 
has contributed to a tendency to 
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underplay the distinct role of states 
and localities in formulating policies 
that determine the quality of our lives. 
(Henig, 1985, p. 2) 
Logically, independent state operations will exist 
primarily within the public sector. 5 A state's public 
sector is less open to interference from the federal 
government. A state's public sector is closely associated 
with the functions and authority of the state. The federal 
government is reluctant about interfering with the public 
sectors of states, largely due to the ambiguous 
constitutional division of powers between states and the 
federal government. According to Henig (1985), state and 
local governments continue to exercise considerable power 
directly in areas normally associated with the public 
sector. These include the delivery of services, regulation 
of businesses and professions, economic development, 
physical infrastructure, and law enforcement (Henig, 1985). 
STATES AS INDEPENDENT ACTORS 
The US Constitution does not permit interference with a 
state's government except under certain conditions. 
Although Article Six establishes federal supremacy, the 
Tenth Amendment reserves any and all powers not clearly 
assigned to the federal government to the states (Houseman, 
1986). The conflict between federal supremacy and states 
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rights remains an issue. Supreme Court decisions provide a 
clear division between state and federal authority, but are 
sometimes reversed and changed, which creates confusion. 6 
Congress attempts to circumvent the confusion and the 
potential limitations upon its powers. Broad 
interpretations of various parts of the Constitution (e.g., 
Commerce Clause) are used by Congress to legitimize 
legislation otherwise violating the Tenth Amendment. For 
example, the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 uses 
two constitutional references, the Commerce Clause and the 
mandate to provide for the general well-being of the public 
(Public Law 91-596, 1970). The broad interpretations of 
Congress and the Supreme Court, intentional or not, weaken 
the autonomy of the states. 
Unfortunately, rather than supporting state autonomy, 
many scholars and citizens see a powerful central government 
as a necessity and look to this government for remedies to 
all of society's ills. The normative and common belief that 
states are not important and the federal government is all 
powerful is not correct. Nor is it a necessity or desirable 
in all circumstances. States have and do play a major role 
in the lives of American citizens - not as functionaries of 
the federal government, but as autonomous governments with 
capacities and resources of their own. Today, states 
operate multi-dimensionally. States may be a bureaucratic 
level for some federal programs and a ally of the federal 
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government in others. Yet, states are much more. They also 
operate independently and alone. It is this which is 
frequently ignored or overshadowed. 
States as independent and autonomous actors is not new. 
States pursued their own interests well before the federal 
government gained ascendancy. Welfare programs, 
environmental protection projects, transportation 
enhancements, labor rights, and other issues were often 
addressed by the states well before the federal government 
became involved. 
The welfare system of today is an excellent example. 
The current program is considered a product of the federal 
government. The federal program grew from the National 
Security Act of 1935 legislated during the Great Depression 
of the 1930s. From this foundation act developed many of 
the welfare programs of today. However, welfare was not a 
national program prior to the Great Depression of the 1930s. 
According to Henig (1985, p. 97): 
Throughout early American history, 
welfare was marked by local efforts. 
Friends and neighbors provided aid to 
widows and orphans - the "worthy poor." 
During the nineteenth century, the 
states became gradually more active. It 
was not until the 1930s, in the 
aftermath of the Great Depression, that 
the national government moved onto 
center stage. 
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States were, and are, involved in areas other than 
welfare. The industrial states enacted and enforced safety 
and health laws well before the federal government 
established programs in these areas. The state of Illinois, 
for example, enacted legislation in 1936 (Health and Safety 
Act, Public Law 1935-36, Third Sp. Sess.) establishing 
minimum safety and health standards for industrial 
operations; 34 years before the passage of the federal 
government's Occupational Safety and Health (OSH) Act of 
1970 (Illinois Public Act 87-245, 1982). Other states 
pursued environmental concerns (e.g., California) before 
such issues became a political necessity in Washington DC. 
In other cases, states established programs and operations 
to sell the products of their industries outside the 
boundaries of the United States and to attract foreign 
investments (e.g., Illinois, Michigan, and Kentucky). One, 
Illinois, opened 'trading centers' in foreign countries to 
promote economic development at home. 
Osborne's (1990) portrayal of the state as a laboratory 
is a useful concept. Its use is not in looking at federally 
supported state programs, but in the autonomous actions of 
the states addressing the concerns and needs of their 
constituencies. Osborne applied his concept to programs 
receiving federal assistance, thereby reducing the 
effectiveness of the model's application. The laboratory 
concept is clearest when focused upon autonomous state 
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programs developed, operated, and maintained from strictly 
state resources - not federal. States did develop programs 
and guidelines for many areas of concern that are now the 
focus of the federal government. Yet many of these state 
programs were developed and accomplished without federal 
assistance, appropriations, or oversight. Gittell (1986) 
recognizes the importance of states as the source of many of 
the federal government's programs of today. She states "it 
would be difficult, in fact, to point to any national 
program that is not an outgrowth of some earlier local or 
state initiative" (Gittell, 1986, p. 2). Social policies, 
such as unemployment legislation, child labor laws, OSH 
acts, and disability support for blue collar workers can be 
traced to the northeastern and mid-Atlantic states. The 
western states' more recent stringent regulatory programs on 
pollution are causing industries look to Washington for less 
restrictive national legislation (Gittell, 1986). 
The third framework, the state as an autonomous entity, 
is alive and still effective. This contradicts the 
prevalent portrayals of the state as a bureaucratic layer 
and the state as a federal ally. States remain capable of 
performing as independent entities. Not only are they 
capable, but they will proceed separately from the federal 
government when it is perceived in their best interests. 
The IGR/Federalist theory is not complete. 
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RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND METHODOLOGY 
This thesis deals with the state as an autonomous 
entity. Through a case study, the thesis focuses upon how 
one state operates within the proposed third framework. I 
selected the state of Illinois's Division of Safety 
Inspection and Education (DSIE), a subordinate unit of the 
state's Department of Labor, to illustrate the third 
framework. The division operates solely within the public 
sector, does not receive any financial support from the 
federal government, and the program it administers is not 
required by federal statutes. 
I look at the development of OSH within the state of 
Illinois prior to the OSH Act of 1970, the state's decision 
to disassociate itself from the federal program in 1974, the 
state legislature's decision to establish DSIE, and the 
growth of the state agency. 
This foundation assists in developing the contextual 
situation used to analyze the state's operation. The 
autonomous nature of the state of Illinois' OSH program from 
federal control and direction establishes the viability and 
applicability of the third framework: the state as an 
autonomous entity. I consider the following questions: 
1. Why did Illinois pursue an OSH program separate 
from OSHA? Illinois chose to be independent of the federal 
program. The state's history shows an active OSH concern. 
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The interests of the state and federal government appear to 
coincide. 
2. Is the Illinois operation truly an autonomous 
program, separate from OSHA? If DSIE is responsible to OSHA 
in any manner, whether financially or through federal 
administrative and regulatory oversight, then the Illinois 
OSH operation does not support the proposed third framework. 
3. What type of IGR communications are exchanged 
between the state and federal programs? State and local? 
Federal intrusion is the concern. A primarily vertical flow 
identifies the presence of a formal relationship between two 
organizations. If the primary flow of communications is 
horizontal, the indication is one of professional exchange 
of information. 
The study indicates the deficiencies of the current 
IGR/Federalist discussion. The study illustrates how the 
current theory fails to account for the independent actions 
of states in which the federal government does not play a 
financial, regulatory, and oversight role(s). I also show 
how the inclusion of the third framework, the state as an 
autonomous entity, enhances IGR and offers a third view of 
federalism. 
The use of the case study approach is often criticized 
for its lack of empirical comparisons. Scholars, such as 
Mccurdy and Cleary (1984), White (1986), and Cleary (1992), 
dismiss the case study approach as unscientific. They 
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stress a more practitioner type approach based upon 
quantifiable data (Cleary, 1992). 
There are, however, proponents of the case study 
approach. Bailey "argues that properly 
structured case studies will live up to the scientific 
standards of rigor, including generalizability, 
transferability, and replicatability" (1992, p. 47). She 
states researchers are being pressured to use "positivist 
social science methodologies thought to be associated with 
'mature disciplines'" instead of case studies (Bailey, 1992, 
p. 48). Bailey points out that case studies are a key 
methodology used by the hard sciences, such as the work of 
physics and chemistry (Bailey, 1992). She concludes her 
argument with (Bailey, 1992, p. 53): 
One of the basic problems in the 
discipline [public administration], 
which may partly explain why case 
studies are generally regarded as weak 
scientifically, is that social science 
programs do not generally stress the 
development of analytical or critical 
thinking skills. In the natural 
sciences, analytical skills are 
developed along with substantive 
knowledge through laboratory courses 
that are linked with classroom 
lectures ... Scholars in public 
administration and the positivist social 
sciences need to understand that the 
case study methods does not necessarily 
equate with lack of theory development, 
and that theoretical research does not 
equate with usefulness. If advancement 
of the field is the goal, then all are 
equally important. 
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Box (1992) also challenges the recent emphasis upon the 
standards and techniques of one type of empirical research. 
He believes this "dramatically narrows the ways in which 
knowledge may be acquired, understood, and communicated" 
(Box, 1992, p. 69). He contends this is a value judgment 
which forces a specific view of knowledge and disregards all 
others (Box, 1992). 
A properly constructed case study is a legitimate means 
of conducting scientific research. The case study itself is 
an analytical view of the relationship of reality to theory 
(Box, 1992). An analytical case study looks at common 
characteristics and relationships in a given situation or 
program. Its use is to determine if a theory is valid, 
reliable, and consistent with the case under study. 
Although the focus is upon the analytical process, certainly 
such a study may provide the basis for further empirical 
research. 
This thesis is not a work of comparison between similar 
governmental agencies. Nor is it a work defining the degree 
to which one unit is more autonomous than another. Rather, 
it is a conceptual exercise directed towards explaining a 
deficiency in the current federalism/IGR theorem and 
offering an additional framework of explanation and study. 
It is not my intention to disprove federalism/IGR, but 
to document the enlargement of the theory. This goal 
required the selection and in depth review of a case which 
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the theory, as currently discussed, fails to explain. This 
same case must also demonstrate the validity of my proposal. 
The criterion for the case study selection was based 
upon the requirements expressed by the proposed addendum to 
the theory. First, the operation had to be authorized and 
administered at the state level. Second, the agency 
responsible for the operation or program must be solely 
funded through state revenues. No financial assistance in 
the form of federal grants or loans could be within the 
budget of the state agency. Third, the agency had to 
operate without federal oversight or control. In summary, 
the entire operation had to be strictly a state operation 
without the formal involvement of the federal government. 
It would be difficult to say the federal government 
does not have any impact upon a state operation. Stretched 
sufficiently, any writer can make a case of federal 
intrusion from purely informal linkages. This only confuses 
the issue and exaggerates the ability of the federal 
government to control state and local governments. 
Therefore, my thesis is restricted to the absence of overt 
control and management elements such as financial, regulatory, 
and administrative constraints. Informal connections 
between state and federal agencies are acceptable provided 
they do not impinge upon the autonomous nature of the state 
operation. However, the existence of such informal channels 
are discussed. 
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I selected the Illinois Department of Labor's Division 
of Safety Inspection and Education (DSIE) for the following 
reasons: 
1) The operation meets the requirements of the 
proposed framework. 
2) Research into the operation is unbiased by the 
presence of other studies and published material. The 
division has not been the subject of any previous serious 
scholarly study to my knowledge and the knowledge of the 
division's staff. 
3) The age of the agency was another important factor. 
I did not want a new agency with less than five years of 
operation since sufficient information for the study may not 
be available. 
My selection of government officials, both federal and 
state, to interview required each prospect meet certain 
criterion. Although these individuals are not the directors 
of the agencies I researched, they are knowledgeable and 
were willing to be interviewed. However, they were 
reluctant to be directly quoted for various reasons. The 
criterion I applied to the selection of interviewees was: 
1) A member of the federal or state agencies directly 
involved in the research. The interviewees had to hold a 
position directly related to the research topic and case. 
For example: OSHA's Directorate of Federal/State Operations 
in Washington, D.C. 
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2) Fully knowledgeable of their agency's policies, 
programs, and procedures as related to the research topic 
and case. Corporate knowledge was also important which 
required individuals with several years employment with the 
specific agency. 
3) Willing to participate in an interview conducted in 
person or by telephone. Personal interviewing was not 
possible with the majority of the prospects. 
The techniques for elite interviewing espoused by 
Mannheim and Rich (1981) were followed to prepare and 
conduct the interviews. Appointments were made in advance 
with each individual, detailed explanations of the 
interview's purpose were avoided to prevent biasing, points 
of contact for verification of authenticity and purpose were 
provided, and follow-up contacts were made to ensure the 
interviews remained on schedule or were rescheduled as 
necessary. Since the majority of the interviews were 
performed over the telephone, special care was taken to 
ensure respondent concerns were met without jeopardizing the 
interview or research. The one in-person interview, 
although Mannheim and Rich (1981) do not recommend 
interviews with more than one interviewee at a time, was a 
joint session with two members of the state agency staff. 
However, the joint interview was necessitated by the 
constraints facing both the interviewer and interviewees. 
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An extensive questionnaire (Appendix 2) was prepared 
for the interviews. The interviews were informal and 
permitted the respondent to respond to the depth each felt 
appropriate. Not all the questions were asked of each 
respondent. Specific questions were extracted from the 
questionnaire for specific interviews. This was necessary 
to align the interviews to the agencies and positions of the 
queried individuals. Often, the answer to one question 
precluded the necessity of asking other questions of the 
same interviewee. This frequently occurred due to the 
breath and depth of the responses provided by the 
interviewee to questions asked earlier in the interview. At 
the end of each interview, the respondent was encouraged to 
provide any additional information or insight they felt 
might be beneficial to my understanding of the topic and 
case. 
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Chapter 2 
OSHA AND THE STATE OF ILLINOIS: 
THE RETURN TO THE THIRD FRAMEWORK 
INTRODUCTION 
The passage of the Occupational Safety and Health (OSH) 
Act of 1970 offered American workers the prospect of a 
unified program dedicated to their health and well-being. 
Congress, the Executive Branch, and the public supported the 
idea. Occupational safety and health (OSH), however, was 
not a new concept. Prior to the enactment of the federal 
program, OSH regulatory guidelines and enforcement already 
existed. Some dated from the 19th Century, others were 
established during the early 20th Century. Enacted and 
managed by state legislatures, state OSH programs addressed 
the major concerns of the state populace and industry. 
State OSH programs generally focused upon the types of 
industry located within their boundaries. For example: 
West Virginia emphasized coal mining and Pennsylvania's 
program included steel production. Various constituencies 
(e.g., labor, business, and child welfare interest groups) 
pressed state legislatures to enact laws concerning child 
labor, industrial workplace safety requirements, and other 
similar safety and health issues. The increasing strength 
of organized labor during the late 1930s through the early 
39 
1950s was reflected in the growth of state OSH regulatory 
efforts up to the passage of the federal OSH Act of 1970 
(Curington, 1988). 
State programs were different from state to state. 
State OSH efforts ran the gamut from negligible or low 
levels of state regulatory oversight to the fairly complex. 
Table 2-1 rank orders state programs based upon the number 
of state OSH codes and regulations in existence on the date 
of the passage of the OSH Act of 1970. 7 The number of state 
OSH codes and regulations provide us with a fairly general 
idea of the diversity of state enforcement efforts before 
the enactment of the federal program. 
States developed, enforced, funded, and administered 
their programs separately from one another and the federal 
government. In the 1960's, there emerged a growing 
awareness of the differences between state programs. 
Although national industry standards (e.g., National 
Electrical Code and National Fire Code) developed by the 
private sector were often incorporated as the mainstay of 
state programs, differences of interpretation and 
application did exist (Curington, 1988). Additionally, 
organized labor became increasingly concerned with areas of 
safety and health either not addressed or adequately covered 
by state programs. The diversity of programs between states 
was seen as a serious problem, especially since 
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Table 2-1 
Number of Industrial Safety Codes 
State Total State Total 
California 99 Colorado 62 
Oregon 98 Delaware 62 
w. Virginia 95 Georgia 61 
Washington 93 Nevada 59 
Alaska 91 Michigan 59 
Kentucky 91 Montana 58 
Indiana 90 Rhode Island 56 
Alabama 89 Wyoming 54 
Maryland 89 New Mexico 54 
Oklahoma 89 Virginia 48 
New York 87 Nebraska 48 
Arkansas 86 Vermont 47 
Washington D.C. 82 Arizona 46 
New Jersey 78 Maine 45 
Tennessee 74 North Dakota 40 
Illinois 74 Iowa 39 
Florida 73 Connecticut 37 
Pennsylvania 72 Utah 36 
Ohio 72 Louisiana 33 
Hawaii 71 New Hampshire 30 
Massachusetts 69 Kansas 27 
Minnesota 67 South Dakota 25 
Wisconsin 67 Mississippi 19 
Idaho 65 Missouri 19 
North Carolina 64 Texas 16 
South Carolina 2 
Median 62 
SOURCE: Extracted from William P.Curington's article, 
Federal Versus State Regulation: The Early Years 
of OSHA, in Social Science Quarterly, pages 342-
343. 
NOTE: "Health regulations and licensing qualifications for 
various occupations are excluded from the total 
number of regulations" (Curington, 1988, p. 343). 
School eye protection laws are also excluded 
(Curington, 1988). 
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standardization between programs did not exist. Organized 
labor believed a centralized and standardized program, 
operated by the federal government, was the cure to the 
problem (McGovern, 1987). 
OSHA 
Development 
The 91st Congress (Second Session) passed Public Law 
91-596 in December 1970. The law, entitled the Occupational 
Safety and Health Act of 1970, established the Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) under the 
administration of the U.S. Department of Labor (McGovern, 
1987). The act was designed in response to a growing 
national concern, largely expressed by labor unions and 
similar special interests, regarding the safety and well-
being of working men and women in the American workplace. 
Later designated 84 Stat. 1590, 29 U.S.C. 553, 651-678, the 
Act was Congress's attempt to meet these needs. 
The Department of Labor and Congress were the 
recipients of heavy union lobby efforts. The Department of 
Labor was considered by many at the time to be sympathetic 
toward organized labor and the need for a national OSH 
policy. The issue of national safety and health standards 
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became politicized (Curington, 1988 and Calavita, 1988). 
The bureaucrats of the U.S. Department of Labor and the 
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, as well as 
members of Congress, saw a federal OSH organization and 
program in an extremely favorable light (Mallino and Werner, 
1973). Who could reasonably dispute the issue? 
Differences arose between the two federal departments 
over the placement of the proposed OSH program. The 
Department of Labor (DOL) and the Department of Health, 
Education, and Welfare (HEW), and their supporters, argued 
among themselves and in Congress to gain control of the 
federal OSH program. The fight was not to establish and 
operate a national OSH program; rather it was which 
department of the Executive Branch would be the program's 
home. A legislative compromise provided each of the 
departments with defined jurisdiction and oversight (Public 
Law 91-596, 1970; McGovern, 1987; and Curington, 1988). 
The Congress also moved to gain state support and 
involvement. The new law contains offers of grants and 
financial aid to those states willing to join the federal 
program. Congress eliminated the potential threat of active 
opposition by those states not willing to join the federal 
program. Either each state actively participates as a 
member of the federal program or OSHA assumes jurisdiction 
over the state's private sector economy (Public Law 91-596, 
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1970). Congress used the Commerce Cause of the U.S. 
Constitution as its authority for this action. 
Two specific Constitutional references were used, 
commerce and the public's general well-being. Section 2, 
paragraph b of the act (Public Law 91-596, 1970) states: 
The Congress declares it to be its 
purpose and policy, through the exercise 
of its powers to regulate commerce among 
the several States and with foreign 
nations and to provide for the general 
welfare, to assure so far as possible 
every working man and woman in the 
Nation safe and healthful working 
conditions and to preserve our human 
resources. 
The Act grants wide ranging powers to the federal 
government and encourages the active participation of state 
polities. The Congress proclaims the purpose of the act is: 
To assure safe and healthful working 
conditions for working men and women; by 
authorizing enforcement of the standards 
developed under the Act; by assisting 
and encouraging the States in their 
efforts to assure safe and healthful 
working conditions; by providing for 
research, information, education, and 
training in the field of occupational 
safety and health; and for other 
purposes. (Public Law 91-596, 1970) 
In effect, Congress created an agency and program to 
regulate the workplaces of America. The agency was granted 
legal authority to develop standards, inspect for adherence 
to these standards, and enforce the use of those standards 
through fine assessment and the judicial system. The two 
constitutional ties (commerce and the public's general well 
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being) prevented the Congress, however, from directly 
including state and local government employees. 
Growing Opposition 
During the first few months of OSHA's operation, 
approximately 4400 job safety and health standards were 
adopted from existing federal directives, industry codes, 
and consensus groups (McGovern, 1987). This number 
continued to grow and prompted complaints the standards were 
excessive and counterproductive. Critics charged the 
standards were often trivial, inflexible, and difficult to 
understand. Penalties, they stated, were often unreasonable 
for first offenses. The costs for compliance would also 
drive small businesses into closure (McGovern, 1987). These 
complaints came from the supporters of business. 
Labor complained OSHA did not perform enough 
enforcement, and when it did, the enforcement was weak and 
sporadic. According to McGovern (1987), organized labor 
leaders frequently criticized the federal agency for acting 
too slowly to correct the thousands of potential OSH 
hazards. 
Most of the complaints from both sides centered on 
OSHA's inspection efforts (McGovern, 1987). Business 
complained about any perceived problem such as overbearing 
inspectors or harsh reports. Labor complained management 
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was not held strictly to task. Labor, for example, would 
complain of weak or sporadic inspections (McGovern, 1987; 
Calavita, 1988; Rees, 1988; and Knudsen, 1988). Simply 
stated, business did not want OSHA around and felt OSHA was 
too tough; while labor felt OSHA was not tough enough. OSHA 
was caught in the middle, as was Congress. Mallino and 
Werner (1973, p. ii) observe: 
Most congressmen had felt secure in 
voting for the Act (who could be against 
safety and health?), and they were 
astonished at the rapid proliferation of 
political problems. Their labor 
constituents were, in the words of 
George Meany, "screaming bloody murder" 
and their business friends were equally 
vocal. On the one hand labor was 
arguing "too slow ... not enough" and on 
the other hand business was insisting 
"too fast ... too much." 
OSHA Standards 
Section 6 of the Act authorizes the Secretary of Labor 
to designate any national consensus standard or federal 
standard as an OSHA standard. The Act requires such OSHA 
standards as improve the health or safety for specifically 
designated employees. A national consensus standard is 
defined in the Act as: 
... any occupational safety and 
health standard ... adopted and 
promulgated by a nationally recognized 
standards-producing organization under 
procedures ... that persons interested and 
affected by ... the standard have reached 
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substantial agreement on its 
adoption, ... [and] was formulated in a 
manner which afforded an opportunity for 
diverse views to be considered 
and ... designated as ... a standard by the 
Secretary, after consultation with other 
appropriate Federal agencies. (Public 
Law 596, 1970) 
The Act also states a federal standard is any existing 
standard used by a federal agency or enacted by Congress 
(Public Law 91-596, 1970). Examples of consensus standards 
are those of the American National Standards Institute Inc. 
and the National Fire Protection Association. The standards 
are broken into four major categories: general industry, 
maritime, construction, and agriculture (McGovern, 1987; and 
Public Law 91-596, 1970). 
State Participation 
Congress encouraged the participation of the states "to 
assume the fullest responsibility for the administration and 
enforcement of their occupational safety and health laws" 
(Public Law 91-596, 1970). Grants were offered for a period 
of up to two years to assist the states to identify "their 
needs and responsibilities in the area of occupational 
safety and health, to develop plans in accordance with the 
provisions of this Act, to improve the administration and 
enforcement of state occupational safety and health laws, 
and to conduct experimental and demonstration projects in 
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connection therewith" (Public Law 91-596, 1970). The Act 
stated nothing in the legislation would prevent a state 
agency or court from exercising its authority under state 
law over occupational safety and health provided an OSHA 
standard was not in effect. 
Under Section 18 of the Act, a state could assume 
responsibility for the development and enforcement of 
occupational safety and health standards for any related 
issues within the state. The state submits a plan to the 
Secretary of Labor for review prior to implementing the 
state program. The state's proposed standards had to equal 
or exceed federal standards. If the Secretary of Labor 
approves the plan, follow-up reports are required from the 
involved state. OSHA also performs inspections to ensure 
the state is within the plan. The Act set a deadline of two 
years, at which time the states would cease enforcing any 
private sector standards they had on the books. States were 
therefore able to legally continue their programs until the 
end of fiscal year 1973 (Public Law 91-596, 1970). 
Section 23, paragraphs f and g, provided for the 
reimbursement of states to a maximum of fifty percent of 
their costs for the administration and enforcement of OSH 
state plans approved by the Secretary of Labor. The Act 
also authorized the Secretary of Labor to assign grants of 
up to fifty percent of a state's total costs to: 
... promote, encourage, or ... engage in 
programs of studies, information and 
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communication concerning occupational 
safety and health statistics; ... assist 
them in developing and administering 
programs dealing with occupational 
safety and health statistics; and ... for 
the conduct of such research and 
investigations as give promise of 
furthering the objectives of this 
section. (Public Law 91-596, 1970) 
The federal government, however, was unable to press 
the issue into the state's public sector. The OSH Act of 
1970 expressly forbids federal preemption of state authority 
within the public sectors of states not participants in the 
federal program. The OSH Act of 1970 did grant the federal 
government control over the public sectors of program 
participant states. OSHA Plan States are required to adhere 
to OSHA requirements in both their private and public 
sectors to gain federal financial support (Public Law 91-
596, 1970). OSHA is authorized to reimburse OSHA Plan 
States up to fifty percent of their OSH program 
expenditures. The financial support requirement enables the 
federal government to apply and enforce OSHA regulations and 
standards within the OSHA Plan States' public sectors. 
Fifty-six separate jurisdictions (other than the 
federal government itself) were potential OSHA Plan States 
(Public Law 91-596, 1970). The Occupational Safety and 
Health Act of 1970 defines state as "a State of the United 
States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Virgin 
Islands, American Samoa, Guam, and the Trust Territory of 
the Pacific Islands" (Public Law 91-596, 1970, Section 
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3(7)). Currently, twenty-five states, territories, 
districts, and protectorates participate as OSHA Plan 
States. Two of these operate only within the public sector 
and receive federal financial assistance (OSHA, 1991). 
These states once operated the federal program within both 
sectors; private and public. Table 2-2 identifies the 
status of each of the fifty-six potential OSHA Plan States. 
That only twenty-five states are OSHA Plan States 
indicates a strong reluctance on the part of potential 
participants to enroll in the federal program. Many 
explanations may exist for the position each state takes. 
Reasons for states to remove themselves from a program also 
vary from state to state (Table 2-3). The fact that less 
than fifty per cent of the potential candidates accepted the 
federal offer is interesting. 
The low level of state acceptance, coupled with the 
passage of twenty-two years since enactment of the OSH Act 
of 1970 and the diminished power of OSHA, offers a unique 
portrayal of states operating to their own advantage 
separate from the federal government. The result is 
de facto resistance to federal intervention. 
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Table 2-2 
STATUS OF OSHA STATE PLAN PROGRAM 
STATE2 
INITIAL FINAL 
APPROVAL APPROVAL 
Alaska x 
Arkansas 
Alabama 
Maine 
New Hampshire 
xa Vermont 
Massachusetts 
Rhode Island 
xa,b Connecticut 
New York xb 
Pennsylvania 
Delaware 
xb Maryland 
West Virginia xb 
Ohio 
xb Virginia 
North Carolina 
xb South Carolina 
Georgia 
Florida 
Mississippi 
xb Tennessee 
Kentucky xb 
Indiana 
xb 
xb 
Michigan 
Illinois 
Wisconsin 
xb Iowa 
Missouri 
Louisiana 
Texas 
xb Minnesota 
Oklahoma 
Kansas 
Nebraska 
South Dakota 
North Dakota 
Montana 
xb Wyoming 
Colorado 
xb New Mexico 
xb Arizona 
51 
Table 2-2 (Continued) 
STATUS OF OSHA STATE PLAN PROGRAM (Con't) 
STATE2 
INITIAL 
APPROVAL 
Utah 
Idaho 
xb Washington 
Oregon xb 
Nevada xb 
California xb 
Hawaii 
Puerto Rico xb 
U.S. Virgin Islands 
Washington D.C.c 
American Samoac 
Guamc 
Trust Territories of 
the Pacific Islandsc 
NOTES: astate Plans for State and Local 
Government Employees Only 
bstate Plans Certified by OSHA 
cstatus Not Identified by OSHA 
FINAL 
APPROVAL 
xb 
xb 
SOURCE: Extracted from Status of State Occupational 
and Health Plans handout of the OSHA Office 
of State Plans (1991). 
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State 
Colorado 
Connecticut 
Illinois 
Montana 
New Jersey 
New York 
Table 2-3 
OSHA State Plan Withdrawal by States 
after Plan Approval by OSHA 
Reason a 
State legislature failed to provide 
funds for continued plan operation. 
Legislature amended its OSH Act by 
repealing the private sector portion of 
the State Plan. 
State voluntarily withdrew its plan 
during its developmentalbstage due to 
political circumstances. 
Enabling legislation rejected; State 
funding withdrawn. 
Enabling legislation rejected; State 
funds withdrawn. 
No enabling legislation. 
North Dakota Enabling legislation rejected; State 
funding withdrawn. 
Wisconsin No enabling legislation; State funding 
withdrawn. 
Notes: aOSHA has never withdrawn a State's plan. The 
above mentioned States voluntarily withdrew their 
plans. 
billinois: Date of Submission of Plan for Approval: 
January 2, 1973. 
Date of Initial Approval: October 
28, 1973. 
Date Plan Withdrawn (After 
Approval): June 30, 1975. 
Source: OSHA Office of State Programs, unpublished 
information sheet, 1991. 
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ILLINOIS AND OSH 
The passage of the OSH Act of 1970 was the beginning of 
the end of Illinois OSH autonomy within its private sector. 
The process took ten years before federal preeminence was 
fully established. State autonomy within the public sector, 
however, remained outside the jurisdiction and control of 
the federal government. Although not legally required by 
the federal government to pursue OSH within the state's 
public sector, Illinois acknowledged its responsibility. 
The culmination of this acknowledgement is the establishment 
and empowerment of the Illinois Department of Labor's (IDOL) 
Division of Safety Inspection and Education (DSIE). 
Illinois is a state with a divergent private and public 
sector base. Heavy and light manufacturing, maritime, 
agricultural, chemical, mining, transportation, 
construction, financial, medical, and many other types of 
industries are indigenous to the state. Few industries are 
new to the state and many existed in various forms well into 
the 19th Century. The public sector is equally diverse with 
a variety of forms and levels of government. Included are 
commissions, departments, agencies, special districts, 
committees, counties, townships, villages, various forms of 
municipal government arrangements, boards, and others. 
Illinois is one of thirty-one states not participating 
in the national program. Operating solely within the public 
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sector, Illinois provides OSH education, inspection, and 
enforcement separate from the federal government. All 
levels and aspects of state and local government operations 
are subject to the purview of DSIE which is strictly a state 
agency. State municipal, county, special district, parks, 
and all other facets of the various units of Illinois 
government are serviced by DSIE. The jurisdictions of DSIE 
and OSHA are clearly defined by the division between the 
public and private sectors. The Illinois operation is a 
prime example of the third framework, states as autonomous 
entities. 
1970-1984 
The history of the federal program has its parallel in 
Illinois. Prior to the enactment of OSHA, Illinois was 
ranked fifteenth in the nation for the number of OSH codes 
(See Table 2-1) (Curington, 1988). Illinois legislators 
endeavored to address at least the minimum of the concerns 
and needs of Illinois workers. The state operated as an 
autonomous entity within both sectors of its economy. 
Federal interference was either very restricted (e.g., 
related to single issues) or absent. 
When the federal act was legislated, Illinois passed 
enabling legislation (a revision of Public Law 1935-36, 
Third Sp. Sess., approved March 16, 1936, entitled Health 
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and Safety Act and began the process to become an OSHA 
approved State Plan State (Arlene Perkins, 10 April 1991 and 
4 February 1992; Gary Smith, 20 February 1991, 9 April 1991, 
10 April 1991, and 6 February 1992; and Illinois Public Act 
87-245, 1982). 
The Illinois Industrial Commission (!IC) was empowered 
to act as the focal organization within the state. The IIC, 
an organization under the state governor's office and 
largely comprised of political appointees, prepared the 
state's proposal to become an OSHA Plan State. Under the 
plan, the state was to assume the full responsibilities of 
OSHA within the state of Illinois, both for the public and 
private sectors. The state's plan mirrored the federal 
program in almost all aspects. Preliminary approval was 
granted by OSHA pending final approval by the Secretary of 
Labor (OSHA OAS Ltr w/Atchs, 1975; Gary Smith, 20 February 
1991, 9 April 1991, 10 April 1991, and 6 February 1992; 
Arlene Perkins, 19 April 1991, and 4 February 1992; Ronald 
Besson, 10 April 1991; Kenneth Gilbert, 20 February 1992; 
and Robert Nichols and Janet Wright, 18 February 1992). 
The aggressive actions of OSHA during the initial years 
of the organization drew considerable opposition. Industry 
felt OSHA was generating standards too quickly, there were 
too many standards, and enforcement was too strict. In 
fact, industry leaders felt OSHA was going too far and, in 
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effect, stifling operations. Organized labor voiced 
concerns OSHA was too lenient and did not do enough. 
The conflict was felt within Illinois. The two extreme 
viewpoints created potentially serious political costs to 
legislators and public officials. Both business and labor 
interests were sure to press their concerns about OSH. 
Business wanted a less constrictive policy, labor wanted 
stricter standards and inspections, and the state - not the 
federal agency - would be the primary focus of the 
conflicting interests. Compromise seemed unattainable, and 
the state found itself in a seemingly no-win situation. 
Further, although the fifty percent reimbursement of 
operating expenses would come from the OSHA, the state 
feared the required state expenditures to operate the 
program would exceed previous expenditures. What appeared 
to be a good idea quickly lost favor within the state's 
political circles. 
The OSH Act of 1970 provided a way out without serious 
repercussions to the state. OSHA is granted power to pursue 
its OSH programs within the private sector of those states 
not designated OSHA Plan States (Public Law 91-596, 1970). 
OSHA, therefore, assumes all OSH regulatory and enforcement 
responsibility within such state private sectors. It meant 
the state need not allocate funds, assume any 
responsibility, and bear any costs (real or political) 
within its private sector. This offers the state the best 
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of two worlds. The state remains out of the conflict and 
the various private sector interests still receive OSH 
oversight. In other words, the state could essentially 
avoid the issue, leaving the responsibility and associated 
difficulties with the federal government. The public 
sector, however, was not included. OSHA could not regulate 
the public sector of the state under the Act (Public Law 91-
596, 1970; Gary Smith, 20 February 1991, 9 April 1991, 10 
April 1991, and 6 February 1992; Robert Nichols and Janet 
Wright, 18 February 1992; and Arlene Perkins, 10 April 
1991). 
In 1974, Illinois took action to drop the proposed 
plan. In June, 1975, the state was officially withdrawn for 
political and financial reasons (OSHA OAS Ltr w/Atchs, 1975; 
Gary Smith, 20 February 1991, 9 April 1991, 10 April 1991, 
and 6 February 1992; Robert Nichols and Janet Wright, 18 
February 1992; and Arlene Perkins, 10 April 1991 and 4 
February 1992). Illinois removed itself from the 
controversy then surrounding OSHA. 
State legislation was not revised to reflect the 
change. The IIC retained responsibility for OSH regulatory 
code enforcement, as well as development. Illinois OSH 
statutes retained their application upon the state's private 
sector. This was in addition to activities on the part of 
OSHA. Unfortunately, the public sector was largely ignored. 
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Increasing pressure to enhance OSH within the public 
sector was brought to bear by a variety of groups ranging 
from concerned citizens to public employee unions. The 
asbestos issue is one subject, albeit one of the more 
publicized and widely discussed OSH problems, pursued by 
various interest groups within the state. These interest 
groups included maintenance workers, teachers, municipal 
officials, and clerical staff. The state attempted to 
resolve such issues under the existing framework of the IIC. 
It became evident the IIC was unable to effectively deal 
with the increasing demand for OSH guidelines, education, 
and inspection. 
Simultaneously, the movement toward professional 
administrators was gaining strength within Illinois. 
Although a civil service structure did exist, many areas 
remained under the political system of patronage such as the 
IIC (Sherlie Scism, 26 September 1991). The Department of 
Commerce and Community Affairs (DCCA) and economic 
development is an example of the 1980s and 1990s. The 
movement is clearly seen in the cases brought before the 
Supreme Court against the state and the patronage system. 
The case of Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois (Supreme 
Court Case 88-1872, decided 21 June 1990) expanded upon 
earlier cases (Elrod v. Burns, 1976 and Branti v. Finkel, 
1980). The court stated the Illinois GOP patronage system 
violated the U.S. Constitution's First Amendment's right to 
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free speech by penalizing government employees and 
applicants for their political affiliation (Anonymous, 
1990). These cases complimented a 'grass roots' concern 
that areas of complexity involving legal, moral, and ethical 
issues required educated, trained, and public service career 
committed individuals for effective management and 
operation. Such fundamental issues included OSH (Nichols 
and Wright, 1992). 
Commercial establishments could be ignored based upon 
the case of Simpson v Marietta Corporation (Illinois Public 
Act 87-245, 1982). The Illinois Industrial Commission (!IC) 
decided the Illinois Health and Safety Act was preempted by 
the federal OSH Act of 1970. The Circuit Court of Peoria 
upheld this decision. The Illinois Supreme Court, in 
Simpson v Industrial Commission (Martin Marietta 
Corporation, Appellee) (91 Ill.2d 452, 440 N.E. 2d 94 
(1982)), recognized "the fact that the Illinois Industrial 
Commission "held that on June 30, 1975, its authority to 
enforce the Illinois Health and Safety Act was effectively 
preempted by the Federal Occupational Safety and Health Act 
(29 U.S.C. sec 651 et. seq. (1976)" and that the Circuit 
Court confirmed this decision" (Illinois Public Act 87-245, 
1982, p. 1, para 137). 
The case ended the IIC's private sector involvement. 
Already under fire for its political patronage status and 
seemingly inept handling of IIC's various responsibilities 
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(of which OSH but one), the court's decision brought closer 
public and legislative scrutiny. 
Establishment of DSIE 
These three factors - IIC ineptitude and court 
recognized preemption by the federal government, increased 
pressure by special interest groups, and the movement 
towards professional administrators - all combined to lead 
to change. In 1985, a revision of existing legislation was 
introduced to establish a new organization within the 
Department of Labor 
In October, 1985, the state legislature revised the 
Safety Inspections and Education Act through Public Act 86-
1435. The original act was passed on 18 July 1955 and 
underwent several revisions during its history (Gary Smith, 
20 February 1991, 9 April 1991, 10 April 1991; and Illinois 
Public Act 86-1435, 1985). 
The 1985 revision provided for the Division of Safety 
Inspection and Education (DSIE) under the Illinois 
Department of Labor (IDOL). The revision outlined the 
responsibilities of the division. The legislation empowered 
DSIE to perform OSH inspections within the public sector and 
to provide OSH education for state workers. The IIC 
remained empowered to promulgate standards and regulations 
(Illinois Public Act 87-245, 1982; and Illinois Public Act 
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86-1435, 1985). This last was a compromise to ensure 
continued political control of the program; possibly as a 
means of responding to business interests. 
Illinois Public Act 86-1435 (1985) placed DSIE's staff 
positions under IDOL, thereby categorizing the positions 
under the state's civil service system. The effect was to 
align the state's OSH program under professional bureaucrats 
rather than political appointees. DSIE OSH personnel 
generally join the organization through entry level 
positions. As they obtain training and experience, DSIE 
personnel progress within the division's hierarchy (Gary 
Smith, 20 February 1991, 9 April 1991, 10 April 1991, and 6 
February 1992; and Robert Nichols and Janet Wright, 18 
February 1992). 
DSIE's first director, Mr. Jerald Pusch, developed the 
framework and strategy of the organization. He deliberately 
established DSIE as a state level mirror image of OSHA. 
Further, he negotiated an intergovernmental letter of 
agreement with !IC delegating to DSIE the authority to 
develop and otherwise promulgate OSH related standards and 
regulations. DSIE, however, initially focused upon state 
agencies and employees, not the lower levels of government 
(IGLOA between IDOL and !IC, 1986; Gary Smith, 6 February 
1992; and Robert Nichols and Janet Wright, 18 February 
1992). 
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Although the language of the Act discusses commercial 
establishments, the intent was to cover only those 
operations performed by state employees and state facilities 
(Gary Smith, 20 February 1991, 9 April 1991, and 10 April 
1991; Robert Nichols and Janet Wright, 18 February 1992; and 
Illinois Public Act 86-1435, 1985). Commercial 
establishments are exempt based upon the court decision of 
Simpson v Marietta Corporation (Illinois Public Act 87-245, 
1982). The language of the Illinois Safety Inspection and 
Education Act, however, did not specify the apparent 
limitation to state employees. 
Shortly after DSIE was established, the American 
Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees 
(AFSCME) filed suit against IDOL on behalf of Illinois 
public sector employees. AFSCME is the largest of the 
public sector employee unions within Illinois. AFSCME 
stated the law did not limit OSH coverage to state 
employees. Non-state level government employees were 
wrongfully excluded by DSIE. The Cook County Circuit Court 
ruled in January 1987 the law extended to all Illinois 
public sector employees under the jurisdiction of the state. 
This included all state, county, municipal, school district, 
and park employees (Circuit Court of Cook County, General 
Chancery Case Number 85CH11947, 1986; Gary Smith, 20 
February 1991, 9 April 1991, 10 April 1991, and 6 February 
1992; and Robert Nichols and Janet Wright, 18 February 
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1992). For the first time, the entire public sector was 
covered under a mandated OSH program. Overnight, DSIE's 
scope of operations expanded several fold. 
The inclusion of the local governments increased the 
need by these polities for OSH training, consultative 
review, and inspection. DSIE conducts seminars and training 
sessions free of charge to state and local governments, as 
well as employee organizations and other interested groups. 
A variety of subjects are available, ranging from office 
safety through the more hazardous operations such as 
trenching. DSIE provides handouts and frequently uses 
audio-visual presentations obtained from the Region 5 off ice 
of OSHA (Ronald Besson, 10 April 1991; Gary Smith, 20 
February 1991, 9 April 1991, and 10 April 1991; and Robert 
Nichols and Janet Wright, 18 February 1992). 
DSIE spends a significant percentage of its enforcement 
activities within the municipalities (the Northern Illinois 
Area Manager reports upward of 80 percent for his area). 
These built-up areas, especially the larger cities, 
generally have the more hazardous operations. The largest 
share of complaints, concurrently, come from the employees 
of these large municipalities (Gary Smith, 20 February 1991, 
9 April 1991, 10 April 1991, and 6 February 1992; ;and 
Robert Nichols and Janet Wright, 18 February 1992). 
Although cross-servicing does exist in cities crossing 
state boundaries (e.g., East St. Louis/St. Louis, and 
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Moline/Rock Island), DSIE does not claim jurisdiction over 
public sector work crews from another state performing tasks 
within Illinois. The state the crew comes from (whether 
Indiana, Missouri, or Iowa) retains jurisdiction. The OSH 
requirements for these states are as stringent, or more so, 
than those of Illinois (Gary Smith, 20 February 1992, 9 
April 1991, 10 April 1991, and 6 February 1992; and Robert 
Nichols and Janet Wright, 18 February 1992). 
OSH Standards 
According to Mr. Smith (20 February 1992, 9 April 1991, 
10 April 1991, and 6 February 1992) and Mr. Nichols (18 
February 1992) every state uses OSHA standards as the basis 
for their internal programs. Federal standards are often 
supplemented by those developed internally by the states as 
well as those taken from industry. The state of Illinois, 
for example, uses the 1910 General Industry Standards. The 
adoption of OSHA and industry standards precludes the 
lengthy and costly development of state standards. 
Therefore, the operational standards of each state basically 
resemble each other (Gary Smith, 20 February 1991, 9 April 
1991, 10 April 1991, and 6 February 1992; and Robert Nichols 
and Janet Wright, 18 February 1992). 
DSIE does not establish or use formal committees to 
review proposed public sector OSH standards. Reviews are 
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conducted internally with affected agencies contacted for 
their input. The Illinois State Legislature's Joint Rules 
Committee reviews any proposed DSIE standards or revisions 
before they are placed into force (Gary Smith, 20 February 
1991, 9 April 1991, 10 April 1991, and 6 February 1992; and 
Robert Nichols and Janet Wright, 18 February 1992). 
In 1988 DSIE initiated development of a new standard 
under delegated authority authorized by the IIC/IDOL Letter 
of Agreement (Gary Smith, 20 February 1991, 9 April 1991, 10 
April 1991, and 6 February 1992; and Robert Nichols and 
Janet Wright, 18 February 1992). This endeavor, the first 
in the history of DSIE, consumed a year of work on the part 
of the division and affected agencies (Gary Smith, 20 
February 1991, 9 April 1991, 10 April 1991, and 6 February 
1992; and Robert Nichols and Janet Wright, 18 February 
1992). The proposed standard dealt with fire 
department/company equipment, supplies, clothing, and 
training. DSIE attempted to gain the acceptance of local 
governments, fire unions, and local fire companies. The 
division contacted ten of the fifteen fire associations 
representing constituent groups within the state. Each of 
the ten associations were solicited for ideas and comments 
on the DSIE prepared draft (Gary Smith, 20 February 1991, 9 
April 1991, and 10 April 1992). Hearings, discussions, and 
conceptual solicitations were held throughout the state to 
acquire support and to develop a workable standard (Gary 
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Smith, 20 February 1991, 9 April 1991, 10 April 1991, and 6 
February 1992; and Robert Nichols and Janet Wright, 18 
February 1992). 
Public hearings were held by the IDOL Hearing Section. 
The section conducts all IDOL hearings. Formal comments and 
recommended changes from the hearings (four hearings in all) 
were addressed individually to ensure each was fairly 
assessed. Prior to the proposed standard reaching the State 
Legislature's Joint Rules Committee, however, it was 
withdrawn (Gary Smith, 20 February 1991, 9 April 1991, 10 
April 1991, and 6 February 1992; and Robert Nichols and 
Janet Wright, 18 February 1992). 
Local governments, particularly the small towns and 
rural areas, opposed the draft standard. The financial 
burden associated with the proposed standard often exceeded 
the fiscal ability of many local governments. Even the fire 
companies themselves were often less than enthusiastic with 
the proposal, perhaps seeing it as an attempt to increase 
the amount of red tape or bureaucratic interference within 
local operations (Gary Smith, 20 February 1991, 9 April 
1991, 10 April 1991, and 6 February 1992; and Robert Nichols 
and Janet Wright, 18 February 1992). 
Pressure was placed on the state's political 
leadership, primarily by local government representatives. 
This was one aspect of efforts to stop the establishment of 
the proposed standard. The second, and concurrent, attack 
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upon the ability of DSIE to promulgate new standards was 
taken by the city of Champaign. Champaign filed suit 
against DSIE in the Sixth Judicial Circuit Court. 
The city of Champaign stated DSIE was not lawfully 
empowered to develop new standards, only to enforce them. 
The city also alleged the Letter of Agreement between IDOL 
and IIC was illegal. IIC could not delegate its authority 
to another agency or organization. The court decided in 
favor of the city of Champaign. DSIE did not file an 
appeal, preferring to resolve the difficulty permanently and 
without further judicial entanglements (Circuit Court of the 
Sixth Judicial Circuit, Case Number 89-C-62, 1991) 
DSIE, through IDOL, requested modification of the 
Safety Inspection and Education Act (Gary Smith, 6 February 
1992 and Robert Nichols and Janet Wright, 18 February 1992). 
Specifically, the proposal empowered DSIE with the ability 
to promulgate OSH related standards and regulations. In 
1991, the state legislature passed the revision with the 
effective date of 21 January 1992. 
The city of Champaign's challenge of DSIE's authority 
to develop standards did not affect the division's ability 
to enforce existing OSHA standards. The authority was 
already granted within the 1985 legislation. DSIE is not 
required to adopt or enforce OSHA standards. The division 
selects standards believed applicable to the unique 
circumstances and needs of the state. The difference 
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between adopting existing standards and establishing new 
standards is not lost upon DSIE leadership and personnel. 
DSIE takes the stance they are using existing standards 
already in force throughout the country. 
DSIE is preparing to regain momentum with the 
reintroduction of the standard for fire 
departments/companies. The division does not intend to make 
the same mistakes of 1988. All the affected unions, 
agencies, and local governments will have the opportunity to 
participate in the process (Gary Smith, 20 February 1991, 9 
April 1991, 10 April 1991, and 6 February 1992; and Robert 
Nichols and Janet Wright, 18 February 1992). The 1991 
legislative empowerment to develop and implement new 
standards provides DSIE with greatly enhanced authority and 
opportunities. 
DSIE Training and Funding 
DSIE uses the OSHA Federal Training Institute in 
Illinois to train division personnel. Training is provided 
free to all public sector government officials with OSH 
responsibilities. The option is available for local 
government employees to attend the OSHA Federal Training 
Institute, although local Illinois government officials have 
not as yet (Gary Smith, 20 February 1991, 9 April 1991, 10 
April 1991; and 6 February 1992; and Robert Nichols and 
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Janet Wright, 18 February 1992). Private corporations may 
also request training allocations for their OSH personnel. 
Many corporations avail themselves of this opportunity. 
OSHA does not limit training strictly to OSHA Plan State 
participants (Gary Smith, 20 February 1991, 9 April 1991, 10 
April 1991, and 6 February 1992; Ronald Besson, 10 April 
1991; Kenneth Gilbert, 20 February 1992; and Robert Nichols 
and Janet Wright, 18 February 1992). 
Illinois pays attending DSIE personnel regular wages 
and per diem during attendance at the Institute. OSHA is 
not reimbursed by Illinois for training costs. None of the 
attending states are required to reimburse OSHA (Gary Smith, 
20 February 1991, 9 April 1991, 10 April 1991, and 6 
February 1992; Kenneth Gilbert, 20 February 1992; and Robert 
Nichols and Janet Wright, 18 February 1992). 
DSIE also makes maximum use of OSHA literature and 
forms within the Illinois program. The literature, 
educational material, and forms are all provided without 
charge to the state. Local governments are not required to 
use the OSHA forms, provided the same information is 
contained in the locally developed record documents. OSHA 
materials are generally available, without charge, to any 
public agency and the general public (Gary Smith, 20 
February 1991, 9 April 1991, 10 April 1991, and 6 February 
1992; Ronald Besson, 10 April 1991; Kenneth Gilbert, 20 
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February 1992; and Robert Nichols and Janet Wright, 18 
February 1992). 
Technically, OSHA's supplying of training and materials 
could be construed as providing financial assistance. 
However stretched this argument may appear, it must be 
addressed. Illinois is not the only recipient of this type 
of support from OSHA. Training materials are readily 
available and free to any level of government involved in 
OSH related activity (e.g., federal, state, county, and 
municipal). None are charged since OSHA is the federal 
source for OSH information and the information is offered as 
a public service. Illinois is not required to participate, 
respond, or in any way reciprocate for these services (Gary 
Smith, 20 February 1991, 9 April 1991, 10 April 1991, and 6 
February 1992; Arlene Perkins, 10 April 1991 and 4 February 
1992; Ronald Besson, 10 April 1991; Kenneth Gilbert, 20 
February 1992; and Robert Nichols and Janet Wright, 18 
February 1992). 
Illinois does receive a federal 7(C)(l) Consultation 
Program Grant from OSHA (OSHA/Region 5, 1990; Arlene 
Perkins, 4 February 1992; Gary Smith, 6 February 1992; and 
Robert Nichols and Janet Wright, 18 February 1992). This 
grant supports a private sector consultative OSH program 
administered by the state's Department of Commerce and 
Community Affairs (DCCA) (Arlene Perkins, 4 February 1992). 
DCCA is not a part of IDOL and is a political organization 
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established by the previous Illinois governor, James 
Thompson. DCCA is the state governor's lead organization 
for private sector economic development. The department 
uses the OSHA 7(c)(l) grant as an inducement to attract and 
retain businesses within the state (Arlene Perkins, 4 
February 1992; and OSHA/Region 5, 1990). 
The OSHA 7(c)(l) funds are not allocated to DSIE or 
enter state coffers for redistribution to DSIE through IDOL. 
DCCA requested the grant as a means of serving the special 
needs of businesses potentially relocating to the state. 
The federal grant is also used to assist existing businesses 
within Illinois to meet OSHA requirements (OSHA/Region V, 
1990; Gary Smith, 6 February 1992; Arlene Perkins, 4 
February 1992; and Robert Nichols and Janet Wright, 18 
February 1992). 
All DSIE funds are obtained purely from state revenues. 
DSIE submits annual budgets to the IDOL budget off ice for 
consolidation and submission through the Governor's office 
to the state legislature. A specific legislative line 
allocation for DSIE does not exist. DSIE defends its 
proposal to the Secretary of IDOL who, in turn, defends 
IDOL's budget request before the legislature. The budget 
request is subject to changes by IDOL, the Governor's 
office, and the state legislature. Once approved, funds 
allocated to IDOL are redivided to the department's 
divisions and offices. DSIE does not receive any federal 
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funds (Arlene Perkins, 10 April 1991 and 4 February 1992; 
Ronald Besson, 10 April 1991; Gary Smith, 20 February 1991, 
9 April 1991, 10 April 1991, and 6 February 1992; Kenneth 
Gilbert, 20 February 1992; and Robert Nichols and Janet 
Wright, 18 February 1992). 
DSIE and IGR Communications 
The majority of contacts between DSIE and OSHA are 
informal. The communication flow is horizontal. DSIE is 
not subject to the directions and requirements of OSHA. The 
relationship between DSIE and OSHA is not one of 
subordinate/superior, nor is it an alliance. Communications 
between the two agencies are largely those of professionals 
within a field of expertise discussing topics related to 
their area of responsibilities. Information related to OSHA 
standards, advice on specific issues or situations, and 
informational discussions on new federal legislation 
routinely pass between the two agencies. Although formal 
communications do exist between DSIE and OSHA, such 
communications are restricted to non-directive areas (e.g., 
training and acquisition of materials). At no time is OSHA 
permitted to direct, oversee, or in any manner become 
involved in DSIE operations. 
Close intergovernmental relations between DSIE and 
OSHA's Region 5 office are characterized by informal 
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contacts. The Northern Regional Office of DSIE is located 
two blocks from OSHA's Region 5 offices. The Springfield 
OSHA center is also readily accessible to the DSIE main 
office. The personnel of the federal and state offices know 
each other and frequently contact each other informally 
(Gary Smith, 20 February 1991, 9 April 1991, 10 April 1991, 
and 6 February 1992; Ronald Besson, 10 April 1991; Kenneth 
Gilbert, 20 February 1992; and Robert Nichols and Janet 
Wright, 18 February 1992). 
Jurisdictional disputes between OSHA and DSIE do not 
occur. A sharp demarcation of responsibility exists between 
the public and private sectors of Illinois. OSHA 
administers the private sector OSH program and DSIE is 
responsible for the state's public sector (Gary Smith, 20 
February 1991, 9 April 1991, 10 April 1991, and 6 February 
1992; Ronald Besson, 10 April 1991; Kenneth Gilbert, 20 
February 1992; and Robert Nichols and Janet Wright, 18 
February 1992). The demarcation is enhanced since 
contractors hired by the state and local governments are 
considered under the jurisdiction of OSHA. This potential 
area of conflict between the federal and state agencies was 
therefore resolved (Gary Smith, 20 February 1991, 9 April 
1991, 10 April 1991, and 6 February 1992; Ronald Besson, 10 
April 1991; Kenneth Gilbert, 20 February 1992; and Robert 
Nichols and Janet Wright, 18 February 1992). 
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The informal relationship between the state and federal 
agencies is close. Both agencies work with each other. 
Inter-governmental referrals flow between the two. DSIE 
refers to OSHA any safety and health hazards DSIE compliance 
inspectors observe within private sector operations. OSHA 
Region 5 does the same, in return, for the public sector. 
Once referred by either office to the other, the matter is 
considered closed by the referring office. DSIE also 
regularly contacts OSHA Region 5 for technical information 
and advice (Gary Smith, 20 February 1991, 9 April 1991, 10 
April 1991, and 6 February 1992; Ronald Besson, 10 April 
1991; Kenneth Gilbert, 20 February 1992; and Robert Nichols 
and Janet Wright, 18 February 1992). 
DSIE maintains informal and formal contact with the 
OSHA Federal Training Institute. Formally, DSIE sends its 
personnel to attend OSH courses offered through the 
Institute. Informally, DSIE personnel frequently call the 
Institute to discuss problems, obtain clarification, or to 
obtain advice (Gary Smith, 20 February 1991, 9 April 1991, 
10 April 1991, and 6 February 1992; and Robert Nichols and 
Janet Wright, 18 February 1992). 
Local governments maintain both an informal and formal 
relationship with DSIE. The character of the relationship, 
unlike the one with OSHA, shows the subordinate nature of 
the local governments. Formally, these governments request 
training and assistance (e.g., advisory inspections) from 
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the division. The formal relationship is characterized by 
the official nature of the contacts, usually in writing. 
DSIE performs inspections, makes reports, reviews records, 
and provides training (Gary Smith, 20 February 1991, 9 April 
1991, 10 April 1991, and 6 February 1992; and Robert Nichols 
and Janet Wright, 18 February 1992). 
The informal relationship is more advisory and usually 
involves telephone conversations. Conversations might 
relate to advice on a concern an employer may have about an 
upcoming project. 8 It may simply be a personal discussion 
about how the DSIE employee thinks a particular program may 
progress (Gary Smith, 20 February 1991, 9 April 1991, 10 
April 1991, and 6 February 1992; and Robert Nichols and 
Janet Wright, 18 February 1992). 
DSIE began making professional contacts outside the 
state within the last few years. DSIE was relatively 
isolated from other states' OSH public agencies until 1990. 
DSIE representatives started attending the quarterly 
meetings of the OSH State Plan Association (OSHSPA). 
Association membership is limited to those states and 
territories with OSHA approved OSH state plans. Currently 
this number is 23 states and 2 territories (Gary Smith, 20 
February 1991, 9 April 1991, and 10 April 1991; Arlene 
Perkins, 10 April 1991 and 4 February 1992; and OSHA Fact 
Sheet, 1991). Illinois attended as an interested party 
(Gary Smith, 20 February 1991, 9 April 1991, 10 April 1991, 
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and 16 February 1992; and Robert Nichols and Janet Wright, 
18 February 1992). 
DSIE also visited the Kentucky Labor Cabinet in 1990. 
Kentucky has an OSHA approved state plan similar to a 
preliminary proposal DSIE personnel were discussing. The 
Kentucky Labor Cabinet continues to maintain an informal 
relationship with DSIE (Gary Smith, 20 February 1991, 9 
April 1991, and 10 April 1991). Otherwise, DSIE does not 
have working relationships with other states. 
SUMMARY 
Prior to 1970, OSH regulation and enforcement within 
the public and private sectors were pursued by state 
legislatures and bureaucrats. State OSH programs and laws 
reflected the concerns of the state populace and industry. 
The states frequently incorporated industry standards into 
their programs. 
and different. 
Each state's program, however, was separate 
The states developed, enforced, and operated 
the programs independent of one another and the federal 
government. The Congressional legislation of the 
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 changed the focus 
from initial actors, the states, to the federal government. 
Congress passed the Act in response to labor union, 
industry, and special interest group concerns about the 
diversity and effectiveness of state programs. These groups 
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believed a centralized and standardized federal program 
would resolve the problem. The federal bureaucracies of the 
Department of Labor and the Department of Health, Education, 
and Welfare supported the proposal. Congress was receptive 
and the general consensus supported a national OSH program. 
The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 was the 
Congressional response. 
The Act's statement of purpose contains references to 
the Constitution's Commerce Clause and the federal mandate 
to pursue the public's well-being. The references enable 
the federal government to circumvent restriction of federal 
involvement within state jurisdictions. The constitutional 
ties, however, limit federal OSH oversight of state public 
sectors. The Act grants the federal oversight agency, OSHA, 
public sector oversight of states voluntarily joining the 
federal government program as OSHA Plan States. 
The prior record of Illinois in OSH regulatory and code 
legislation projects an image of a state whose OSH interests 
coincide with the federal government. The passage of the 
OSH Act of 1970 offers state legislators and regulators the 
opportunity to draw upon federal resources. The Act 
authorizes grants to investigate and develop a state program 
matching the new federal program. Training, materials, and 
fifty percent of operating expenses are offered as 
incentives to states to become OSHA Plan States. The 
benefits under the federal legislation seems clear. The 
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state benefits by reducing its outlay while addressing the 
needs of worker constituents. 
Illinois moved to accept the federal government's 
offer. Existing legislation was revised to align the state 
with OSHA Plan State requirements. A single organization 
was established to head the state program and act as the 
primary OSHA point of contact. However quickly Illinois 
appeared moving towards OSHA Plan State status, public 
dissatisfaction with OSHA overtook the state. 
The political costs associated with acting as a federal 
proxy became more than the state's political leaders were 
willing to accept. Organized labor and business interests 
were raising their voices against OSHA. If the state became 
an OSHA Plan State, the political costs would have serious 
and detrimental impacts upon the state's political 
leadership. 
Not only would political costs be high, but so would 
the state's financial burden. The size of the required 
program, covering both public and private sectors, the 
number of businesses to be inspected, the associated 
administrative support, and other factors demanded a fairly 
sizable state operation. The state's share of fifty percent 
of the program costs was viewed as more than the state 
legislature was willing to allocate. 
The withdrawal of Illinois from the OSHA Plan State 
Program left the state's private sector under federal 
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control. Legitimately, the only remaining sector for 
Illinois to administer was the public sector. Yet this 
sector was largely ignored until 1985. 
The ten year period between 1975 and 1985 saw a gradual 
movement towards an active public sector OSH program. There 
was a movement towards a more professional government away 
the existing political patronage system. Dissatisfaction 
with the old system, disenchantment with IIC, and an 
increasing awareness of the need for an OSH program 
contributed to the 1985 legislation of a professional public 
sector OSH organization and program. The result was the 
Division of Safety Inspection and Education (DSIE) under the 
Illinois Department of Labor (IDOL). 
Court decisions also defined the scope of Illinois's 
public sector OSH program. The 1986 AFSCME and 1990 city of 
Champaign cases led to broader powers and responsibilities 
for the new state OSH organization. The AFSCME decision 
required coverage of all public sector employees within 
Illinois; not just state employees. The court decision for 
the city of Champaign forced Illinois' legislature to 
formally grant DSIE the ability and authority to promulgate 
and enforce new OSH standards. 
A long term advantage also exists. Should the state 
decide to reapply for OSHA State Plan status, the structure 
exists to assume the new role. Discussions within DSIE 
periodically occur about the possibility of pursuing OSHA 
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State Plan status. These discussions remain relatively 
informal due to the political and fiscal restrictions facing 
the state. Disagreement exists within DSIE about the 
benefits, feasibility, and even the wiseness of such a move. 
DSIE's first director, Mr. Jerald Pusch, established 
the division as a mirror image of OSHA. OSHA was 
approximately fifteen years old and well established. 
Regulations and directives already existed and were readily 
available. OSHA standards were in use throughout the 
country and easily obtained. Copying OSHA to structure DSIE 
and to define its operations was the most cost effective and 
efficient means available to the new director. The time and 
money necessary to develop and structure an entirely new 
organization was unacceptable to the state legislature and 
governor's office. OSHA was an established organization, 
OSHA standards were nationally accepted, and the federal 
program's guidelines had already stood the test of legal 
application and time. Copying was an expedient means to an 
end. Copying OSHA also made it possible for DSIE to easily 
draw upon OSHA's educational, technical, and informational 
resources. 
Although the division is a state level copy of OSHA, 
DSIE is separate and independent of the federal agency. 
DSIE's funding is through the state budgetary process and 
does not include any federal financial assistance. The 
division is purely a state organization without federal 
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oversight. The division, although a state level copy of 
OSHA, is not a functionary of OSHA and is autonomous of the 
federal program. Copying successful programs of other 
government entities is an acceptable practice whether 
discussing economic development, municipal organization, or 
a myriad of other topics. The federal government copies 
state programs and the states copy each other and the 
federal government. 
The only true formal relationship between DSIE and OSHA 
is for training. DSIE uses the OSHA Federal Training 
Institute as the primary source of instruction for division 
personnel. DSIE uses the training to enable its personnel 
to effectively perform their duties. DSIE enforcement 
personnel positively progress within the division as they 
gain OSH experience and knowledge. 
Although the federal government provides the training 
without charge, the state subsidizes its attendees with per 
diem and training pay. OSHA training is freely offered to 
any OSH public sector agency. Corporate personnel may also 
attend, provided openings exist in the classes. None of the 
organizations attending the training reimburse the federal 
government. Relations, otherwise, between the two agencies 
are characterized by informal communications. 
DSIE and OSHA (represented by Region 5 of OSHA in 
Chicago and by the Springfield OSHA office) know each other. 
Information exchange is routine and the personnel of both 
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organizations maintain friendly relations. DSIE personnel 
frequently informally contact their OSHA counterparts for 
advice and technical data. 
DSIE is a relatively new organization. The history 
leading to its enactment and empowerment provide an example 
of a state weighing costs, dangers, benefits, as well as 
attempting to determine the state's realm of responsibility. 
Illinois selected to refrain from becoming an OSHA Plan 
State. The decision was the result of weighing the costs 
involved with acceptance and refusal. The state gained 
federal oversight at a cost. The state lost autonomy to the 
federal government for private sector OSH enforcement. OSHA 
control of the state's private sector could not be avoided. 
OSHA would control the sector either through the state or 
directly. Illinois autonomy in the private sector for OSH 
ended with the passage of the OSH Act of 1970. 
Illinois did not lose public sector OSH autonomy. 
Although largely ignored by the state until the mid-1980s, 
the public sector was closed to OSHA. Political necessity 
led to enabling legislation forming the Division of Safety 
Inspection and Education (DSIE) under the Illinois 
Department of Labor (IDOL). Pressures for a professional 
state OSH agency had gained supporters within the state's 
bureaucracy, legislature, unions, and the governor's office. 
This concern was perceived and addressed by the state 
without direction or requirement by the federal government. 
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Currently, DSIE maintains itself separate from OSHA. 
Although receiving educational and informational assistance 
from OSHA, the division remains a state agency without 
federal oversight. 
DSIE supports the third framework, the state as an 
autonomous entity. The division is a state operation, 
funded from state revenues, authorized by state law, with 
oversight performed by the state legislature and Illinois 
Department of Labor. DSIE performs OSH enforcement, 
education, inspection, and review for the public sector of 
the state. The division's area of responsibility is outside 
the jurisdiction of OSHA which operates within Illinois' 
private sector. DSIE operates separately and independently 
of OSHA. The factors of autonomy and federal intrusion 
clearly show the absence of federal oversight and control of 
DSIE. Illinois' public sector OSH program is autonomous of 
the federal government. 
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Chapter 3 
CONCLUSION: 
THE THIRD FRAMEWORK 
The current theory of federalism/IGR fails to account 
for the autonomous actions of states. The theory's central 
focus views the federal government as the primary actor in 
federal-state relations. States are portrayed as 
functionaries or junior partners of the federal government. 
These portrayals reflect the two frameworks of 
federalism/IGR, the state as a bureaucratic layer and the 
state as a federal ally. Neither of the two frameworks 
explain programs states pursue independently and separately 
of the federal government. 
FEDERALISM/IGR FRAMEWORKS 
The first framework views states as a functionary level 
within a definite federal hierarchy, the state as a 
bureaucratic layer. The framework perceives the state as a 
formal part of a bureaucratic chain reaching from the 
individual citizen to the federal government. Within the 
bureaucratic framework, the state operates as a functionary 
of federal organizations. Program criterion are strictly 
defined and autonomy is severely constrained by the federal 
government. State participation may not be voluntary. 
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Cooptation is one method the federal government exercises to 
gain state participation. 
The second framework, the state as a federal ally, 
depicts states operating within broad guidelines investing 
considerable room for interpretation. The federal 
government loosely prescribes state limits and 
responsibilities. Federal involvement and oversight are 
less rigid than under the bureaucratic framework. Federal-
state financial arrangements are normally one of the more 
general categories of assistance and aid. Ties still exist, 
however, and the federal government retains authority and 
oversight. The state is a junior partner in the 
arrangement. The federal government dictates how funds are 
obtained and expended, the restrictions and requirements 
that apply, and the administrative controls the states must 
follow. The states, nonetheless, are able to pursue their 
own political agendas so long as they fulfill the federal 
goals. 
I propose a third framework, the state as an autonomous 
entity. Autonomy and federal intrusion progress to the next 
logical step of diminishing federal control and presence -
absence. The federalism/IGR continuum has the extreme of 
federal involvement outlined iri the state as a bureaucratic 
layer. The state is a functional part of the federal 
bureaucracy with very limited, if any, autonomy. The 
federal government intrudes into the practices, procedures, 
86 
and routine operations of its state proxy even to the lowest 
level. The middle area of the federalism/IGR continuum is 
expressed by the framework of the state as a federal ally. 
The state has greater autonomy and more freedom of action. 
Federal intrusion is not as pervasive or stringent. The 
state, however, is not completely autonomous and free of 
federal intrusion. The federal government retains some 
authority and control. Although the state acts as a 
partner, the reality suggests the federal government is 
senior. 
The third framework, the one proposed by this thesis, 
carries autonomy and intrusion to the other extreme end of 
the federalism/IGR continuum - full state autonomy and the 
complete absence of federal intrusion. The state pursues 
its own interests separate and independent of the federal 
government. The state allocates and expends funds from 
state revenues, not the federal government. Federal 
regulations do not mandate or require state action. Lastly, 
program oversight resides within the state. The federal 
government does not possess oversight authority. The state 
independently pursues a program or project to meet 
constituency needs and concerns. The programs are 
established, funded, operated, and overseen by the state -
not the federal government. Logically, these independent 
state operations exist primarily within the public 
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sector. The state's public sector is less vulnerable to 
federal government interference. 
AUTONOMY AND FEDERAL INTRUSION 
The principal criterion underpinning the three 
frameworks are the concepts of autonomy and federal 
intrusion. Autonomy addresses the freedom of action and 
decision a state may possess. Three areas of concern within 
autonomy are the existence of federal financial structures, 
regulatory requirements, and administrative constraints. 
Financial structures assess the degree and type of federal 
financial supports of a state. Regulatory requirements 
define the restrictions and limitations imposed by the 
federal government. Administrative constraints considers 
the extent of federal bureaucratic arrangements the state 
must accommodate. 
The second concept, federal intrusion, frequently 
overlaps autonomy. Unlike autonomy's structural focus, 
federal intrusion centralizes upon the depth of federal 
activity into state operations and programs. Two criterion 
reveal the extent of federal intrusion. The first is 
information flow. Information flow direction is categorized 
as horizontal or vertical. The nature of the information is 
closely aligned with direction. Vertical flow coincides 
with formal communications and horizontal with informal 
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communications. The second is the extent by which federal 
assistance and regulations intrude upon the decision-making 
capacities of the state. It assesses the degree to which 
federal influence permeates the state organization. 
The first framework, the state as a bureaucratic layer, 
is characterized by limited or nonexistent autonomy. The 
parameters and restrictions on use and expenditure of 
federal funds constrains the state. Regulatory requirements 
impose restrictions upon the state's operation of federal 
programs. Federal agencies outline administrative 
constraints in strict terms. An extreme example of the 
first framework is federal government cooptation of state 
operations (e.g., Civil Rights). The framework defines the 
state as a bureaucratic level working for the federal 
government. 
The second framework, the state as a federal ally, is 
less restrained than the bureaucratic framework. 
Substantial room for interpretation, broad guidelines, and 
fairly liberal use of federal funds characterize the 
framework. The states are free to pursue their own agendas, 
provided the federal agenda is fulfilled (e.g., California's 
environmental programs and the federal EPA requirements). 
The federal government retains a measure of control over 
state operations. The federal government mandates how funds 
are obtained and expended, restrictions and requirements 
related to the funds, and administrative controls. Although 
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the states are partners to the federal government, but they 
remain junior in the relationship. 
The two frameworks do not explain state pursuit of 
programs and projects independent of the federal government. 
The logical extension of autonomy and federal intrusion to 
their absence establishes the third framework, the state as 
an autonomous entity pursuing its own interest. Federal 
funds are not used, federal regulations do not require state 
action, and the federal government does not possess 
oversight authority. The state elects to establish, fund, 
operate, and oversee programs and projects without federal 
interference (e.g., DSIE and OSHA). Logically, independent 
state operations exist within the public sector where the 
federal government is less able to intrude. 
INQUIRY RESPONSES 
The current frameworks, the state as a bureaucratic 
layer and the state as a federal ally, fail to explain 
Illinois' operation of the Division of Safety Inspection and 
Education (DSIE). DSIE does not fit the criterion of either 
framework. The current federalism/IGR theory is unable to 
categorize the operation since the necessary framework is 
not conceptualized. The theory lacks the ability to explain 
the full range of activities within the federal system of 
government. 
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The first framework, the state as a bureaucratic layer, 
is unable to accommodate the Illinois operation. DSIE is 
not a participant in the federal OSH program. The division 
does not perform operations on behalf of OSHA or any other 
federal agency. DSIE's program criterion are state generated 
and not established, directed, or defined by the federal 
government. The division's autonomy of action is not 
determined or constrained by OSHA. DSIE operates within the 
public sector while OSHA is restricted to the private sector 
by the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (Public 
Law 91-526, 1970). Oversight of DSIE is performed by the 
state of Illinois, not OSHA. 
The second framework, the state as a federal ally, does 
not correspond to the DSIE operation. All of the same 
observations for the first framework demonstrate the 
inability of the second framework to define and categorize 
DSIE. Other measures further prevent categorizing DSIE as a 
federal ally. Federal financial structures do not directly 
or indirectly support DSIE's occupational safety and health 
(OSH) operations. DSIE is not subject to OSHA's regulations 
and administrative requirements. The Occupational Safety 
and Health Act of 1970 prohibits OSHA control of state 
public sector OSH operations except within states which 
voluntarily join the OSHA Plan State Program (Public Act 91-
526, 1970). 
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Although DSIE is a mirror image of OSHA, the division 
remains separate and autonomous. The division uses many of 
the OSHA standards and regulations in its program. 
OSHA was well established, the regulations and directives 
already existed and were readily available, and OSHA 
standards were in use throughout the country and easily 
obtained. Copying OSHA was the most cost effective and 
efficient method of establishing the new state agency. The 
time and money necessary to develop and structure an 
entirely new organization was unacceptable to the state 
legislature and governor's office. Patterning OSHA also 
made it possible for DSIE to easily draw upon OSHA's 
educational, technical, and informational resources. DSIE's 
funding is through the state budgetary process and does not 
include federal financial assistance. The division, 
although a state level image of OSHA, is not a functionary 
of OSHA and is autonomous. Emulating successful programs of 
other government entities is a common practice, the federal 
government replicates state programs and the states 
duplicate programs of the federal government and other 
states. 
Illinois' public sector OSH agency conforms with the 
criterion of the proposed third framework, the state as an 
autonomous entity. All the reasons preventing the 
application of the first two frameworks are supportive of 
the third. DSIE is strictly funded through state revenues 
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and is free of federal government regulations and 
administrative requirements. Federal intrusion is absent. 
Information flow between DSIE and OSHA is horizontal and 
informal. Federal oversight is nonexistent and OSHA is 
unable to define DSIE operations. 
I asked three questions in my introduction: 1) Why did 
Illinois pursue a separate OSH program?, 2) Is the Illinois 
operation truly an autonomous program?, and 3) What type of 
IGR communications are exchanged? The answers to these 
questions firmly establish the Illinois operation within the 
framework of the state as an autonomous entity. 
Why Did Illinois Pursue a Separate OSB Program? 
Three questions, as stated earlier, are pertinent to 
this thesis, although many could apply. The first asks why 
Illinois pursues a separate OSH program. Prior to the OSH 
Act of 1970, Illinois' involvement in OSH ranked the state 
fifteenth in the nation for the number of OSH codes and 
regulations (See Table 2-1) (Curington, 1988). The Act 
offered incentives to states voluntarily joining with OSHA 
as OSHA Plan States. The major incentive was federal 
reimbursement of fifty percent of state OSH program costs. 
Illinois' prior OSH interest seemingly coincided with the 
federal agency's charter. The added federal funding 
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incentive appeared to offer an excellent opportunity to the 
state. 
Illinois moved towards joining the OSHA Plan State 
Program. The state legislature revised the Health and 
Safety Act, Public Law 1935-36, aligning the state's OSH 
program with the federal program (Illinois Public Act 87-
245, 1982). The Illinois Industrial Commission (!IC) was 
empowered to act as the state OSH action agency and OSHA 
focal point. Illinois submitted a plan to OSHA mirroring 
the federal program in almost all aspects. Preliminary 
approval was granted by the federal agency pending the 
approval of the Secretary of Labor (OSHA OAS Ltr w/Atchs, 
1975). 
Illinois, however, was unable to complete the process. 
OSHA came under fire by industry and organized labor. OSHA 
adopted approximately 4400 job safety and health standards 
within the first few months of operations. The new 
standards were drawn largely from existing federal 
directives, industry codes, and consensus groups. Most of 
the criticism centered upon OSHA's enforcement program. 
Industry complained of overbearing inspectors and harsh 
reports. Organized labor criticized OSHA for weak and 
sporadic inspections which did not hold management strictly 
to task (McGovern, 1987). The outcry against OSHA was felt 
in Congress, the federal Department of Labor, OSHA, and 
Illinois. 
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The state of Illinois' legislature and public officials 
quickly perceived the potentially serious political costs. 
Industry and organized labor interests maintained strong 
political presences within the state. Each were sure to 
press their OSH concerns. If Illinois assumed OSHA's 
responsibilities, the state - not OSHA - would be the 
primary focus of these conflicting interests. The state 
would also be held to OSHA's regulations and administrative 
controls. The federal funding incentive, likewise, lost its 
allure. The Illinois share of fifty percent of program 
costs threatened to exceed the expenditure levels of the 
pre-1970 state OSH program. The state's political 
leadership (e.g., state legislators and governor) became 
adverse to continuing the pursuit of OSHA Plan State status. 
Illinois requested withdrawal of the request in 1974 
for political and financial reasons. In June, 1975, the 
Secretary of Labor officially accepted Illinois' withdrawal 
(OSHA OAS Ltr w/Atchs, 1975). The state gained and lost by 
this action and under the OSH Act of 1970. The Act empowers 
OSHA to pursue OSH programs within the private sectors of 
the states not designated OSHA Plan States (Public Law 91-
596, 1970). This meant Illinois was not responsible for 
funding and performing private sector OSH regulatory and 
enforcement. The state avoided the conflict between labor 
and industry, abdicating responsibility to the federal 
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government. Yet, Illinois retained control over the state's 
public sector. 
State private sector OSH authority was preempted by 
OSHA. Federal government preemption was recognized by the 
Illinois Supreme Court in Simpson v Industrial Commission 
(Martin Marietta Corporation, Appellee) (91 Ill.2d 452, 440 
N.E. 2d 94 (1982)). The court ruled "the fact that the 
Illinois Industrial Commission "held that on June 30, 1975, 
its authority to enforce the Illinois Health and Safety Act 
was effectively preempted by the Federal Occupational Safety 
and Health Act (29 u.s.c. sec 651 et. seq. (1976)" (Illinois 
Public Act 87-245, 1982, p. 1, para 137). 
Illinois' private sector OSH regulation and enforcement 
ended with the case. The court's decision brought closer 
public and legislative scrutiny upon the IIC. The IIC was 
already under fire for its political patronage status and 
seemingly inept handling of its various responsibilities. A 
movement within Illinois also existed for increased 
professional administration of state programs. The movement 
called for professional administrators to manage complex 
areas involving legal, moral, and ethical issues. 
Concurrently, a variety of interest groups were increasing 
pressure to enhance the public sector OSH program. The 
asbestos issue was one of the more publicized subjects which 
rallied diverse interests calling for a strong state 
program. The IIC was unable to effectively deal with the 
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increasing demand for OSH guidelines, education, and 
inspection. 
The Illinois legislature responded to these three 
factors and revised the Safety Inspections and Education Act 
in October, 1985 (Public Act 86-1435, 1985). The Act 
established DSIE under the Illinois Department of Labor 
(IDOL). DSIE is chartered as the state's public sector OSH 
program agency. 
Is the Illinois Operation Truly an Autonomous Program? 
The second question assesses the autonomy question. Is 
the Illinois operation truly an autonomous program; separate 
from OSHA? As noted earlier, OSHA is unable to enforce its 
OSH program within the public sector of Illinois. The OSH 
Act of 1970 specifically prohibits the federal agency from 
operating within the public sectors of non-OSHA Plan States. 
OSHA cannot enforce its regulations and requirements upon 
the state program since DSIE operates strictly within the 
public sector. 
DSIE was deliberately established as a mirror image of 
OSHA for expediency and ease. OSHA was approximately 
fifteen years old, its standards were commonly accepted, and 
the basic guidelines existed and were readily available. 
Copying OSHA was the most cost effective means available. 
The time and money associated with developing and 
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structuring a new organization was unacceptable to the 
governor and state legislature. The mirror image structure 
also made it easier for the division to draw upon OSHA's 
resources. DSIE, however, remains independent of OSHA and 
is strictly under the auspices of the state. 
DSIE does not receive federal funding for its 
operations. Illinois receives an OSHA 7(C)(l) Consultation 
Grant. The grant is allocated to the Illinois Department of 
Commerce and Community Affairs (DCCA) for private sector 
consultations (OSHA/Region v, 1990). DCCA is not affiliated 
with IDOL or DSIE. The OSHA grant is used to attract and 
assist private industry. 
DSIE is funded through state revenues. Each year, the 
division's staff prepares a budget request for submission to 
the Illinois Secretary of Labor. The request is reviewed 
and incorporated into the IDOL budget. The IDOL budget is 
submitted to the state's legislature through the governor's 
office. DSIE does not have a specific line allocation in 
the state budget. The division's funds are part of the 
overall IDOL budget and are not, directly or indirectly, 
derived from the federal government. 
DSIE uses the OSHA Federal Training Center to obtain 
training. OSHA provides the training, without charge, to 
any public agency with OSH responsibilities. Private sector 
corporations are also permitted to send personnel. None of 
the states and companies are required to reimburse the 
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federal government agency. Illinois does pay DSIE personnel 
per diem and wages during their attendance at the center. 
DSIE is not required to use OSHA standards. The 
division reviews OSHA standards and adopts those believed 
desirable to the state. DSIE officials assert every state 
follows this practice. This common activity provides a the 
states with standards that are commonly accepted and often 
proven by time and court challenges. Copying also saves the 
state revenue, lengthy development, and reduces the 
potential for legal entanglements. Federal standards are 
often supplemented by state developed standards and those 
adopted from industry. DSIE, for example, adopted the 1910 
General Industry Standards. 
Illinois has not implemented a state developed 
standard. DSIE did initiate development of a new standard 
in 1988 for fire departments and companies. The standard's 
development was dropped after a year because of strong 
opposition and a court suit over the legal authority of DSIE 
to promulgate new standards. Local governments opposed the 
standard for financial reasons, fire departments and 
companies were suspicious of DSIE's reasons, and not all of 
the fire unions were consulted which created ill will. The 
city of Champaign filed suit against DSIE to prevent the new 
standard. The city alleged DSIE did not have the legal 
authority to develop and enforce new standards. The 
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political and legal pressure forced the division to drop the 
proposal until resolution of the legal question. 
DSIE, though it resembles OSHA, is a distinct and 
separate agency. DSIE is not responsible to the federal 
government for public sector OSH activities. Financial 
support is solely from state revenues. Oversight of the 
agency is performed by IDOL and the state legislature, not 
OSHA. Finally, DSIE adopts only those OSHA guidelines, 
standards, and regulations useful and applicable to the 
state. These are revised and reviewed as needed by DSIE. 
What Type of IGR Communications are Exchanged? 
My last question concerns communications. What type of 
!GR communications are exchanged between the state and 
federal programs? State and local? !GR communications 
between DSIE and OSHA are horizontal. Vertical 
communications are virtually nonexistent. OSHA is unable to 
direct action by DSIE. DSIE communications with OSHA are 
characterized by informal contacts to obtain advice and 
information. The contacts are exchanges between 
professionals within a field of responsibility. These 
exchanges are similar to discussions of 'picket fence 
federalism' in which professionals within a field of 
expertise discuss topics affecting each other. Picket fence 
federalism, however, usually entails some form of formal 
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linkages between the agencies employing these professionals. 
Formal linkages do not exist between OSHA and DSIE. The 
personnel of DSIE and OSHA's offices (Region V and 
Springfield), however, do know each other and routinely 
converse on OSH topics. The majority of the contacts are 
performed by telephone. Formal contact does exist, but 
strictly for training allocations. 
The relationship between DSIE and local governments is 
both horizontal and vertical. DSIE maintains a formal 
relationship characterized by the official nature of the 
contacts. DSIE performs inspections, prepares reports, 
reviews records, and provides training. Informally, local 
government officials and DSIE personnel discuss OSH issues. 
Telephone conversations frequently occur related to advice 
on a local government official's concerns or the progress of 
legislation or particular programs. 
Illinois operates within the third framework, the state 
as an autonomous entity, for its public sector OSH program. 
The state responded to the need for a public sector OSH 
program and the concerns of the various interests within 
Illinois' borders. The case study firmly and clearly 
demonstrates the validity and reliability of the proposed 
framework. Consistency can only be established through the 
application of the proposed framework to other state 
operations. 
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SUMMARY 
The current federalism/IGR frameworks provide us with 
only a limited understanding of federal-state relations. 
They do not provide us with a full continuum of 
explanations. The state as a bureaucratic layer provides us 
with an extreme view of autonomy and federal intrusion. The 
second framework, the state as a federal layer, rests within 
the middle area of federal-state relations. Beyond this 
framework lies an area largely ignored by scholars. A third 
framework is necessary to provide the researcher with the 
full spectrum of possible explanations from one extreme of 
the continuum to the other. Autonomy and federal intrusion 
provide the main criterion for defining the federal-state 
relationship. They must be carried to their logical 
extremes - fully autonomous state involvement and the 
absence of federal intrusion - necessitating the formulation 
of a third explanative framework. The state as an 
autonomous entity satisfies this need. 
State autonomy is a reality. States retain the ability 
to respond independently, even in this day of a strong and 
centralized federal government. State autonomy is moving 
into new arenas of operation. Technology and the demands of 
our rapidly changing society creates new opportunities for 
states. The accelerating pace of scientific discoveries and 
their subsequent applications often require changes to old 
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political responses, as well as new and innovative 
approaches. American society itself is changing. New 
pressures are placed upon society and the political system. 
These changes in society and science will continue to grow 
and expand. Flexible and innovative government is a 
necessity if the needs and concerns of citizens are to be 
met. The federal government is a critical player and will, 
no doubt, continue as a significant actor into the future. 
The states, however, are closer to their constituents. 
State leaders are able to allocate resources quicker than 
the federal government to meet the concerns and needs of 
their constituents. States are also able to concentrate 
their resources easier because their populations and 
geographic types are smaller and less diverse. 
The ability of states to act as autonomous entities is 
not new. States are the first bastions of political action. 
Local needs and concerns are first expressed within state 
and local governments. The political leaders of these 
polities are responsible to their electorate. They can 
often address issues through the powers of their offices. 
Therefore, states are the first arena of political change -
not Washington D.C. It is critical to remember that each 
state's needs and concerns are not necessarily shared with 
other states. 
Nonetheless, if enough states address an issue, 
political pressure is sufficient, and if there exists strong 
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public interest and support - Congress usually reacts. 
States are the first arena of change, but the federal 
government retains the charge to address national issues. 
If a national consensus exists, the federal government can 
play a legitimate role. Until such a consensus is 
discerned, states can often effectively respond to the 
concerns and needs expressed by their constituencies. 
Second, states often establish programs to address 
areas of concern not covered by federal government programs. 
Since each state is different, the concerns and needs of a 
state may not be fully addressed by a federal program. The 
ability of the federal government to respond to an issue may 
be limited by legal, constitutional, and legislative 
restrictions. These gaps in program coverage are often 
addressed by state programs. 
Third, states are also constitutional powers however 
much the Congress may impinge upon state rights. The 
confusion caused by ambiguous and seemingly opposing parts 
of the Constitution contributes to the conflict within 
federal-state relations. States are not generally 
acquiescent to federal encroachment and often carry their 
case to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court established 
itself as the final arbitrator of disputes over 
interpretations of the Constitution. Court decisions, 
however, contradict themselves adding to the confusion. The 
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decisions of the court supported states as well as the 
federal government. 
This thesis demonstrates the applicability of the third 
framework to IGR and Federalism. States do pursue their own 
interests free of federal entanglements. States will 
establish and operate programs and projects without federal 
funds, oversight, or direction to pursue such objectives. 
The states' authority to address the concerns and welfare of 
their constituents is expressed within the Constitution of 
the United States. 
The growth of a powerful and centralized authority -
the federal government - overshadows efforts of the 
individual states. The public and special interest groups 
increasingly look to Washington D.C. to answer their 
problems and concerns. Yet states retain the ability to 
respond within their own borders. The states are often the 
better level of government to address constituent interests. 
I endeavored to look at one independent operation 
established, funded, and operated by the state of Illinois. 
The Division of Safety Inspection and Education (DSIE) 
provides a strong case study to explain and represent the 
concept of 'The State as an Autonomous Entity.' 
105 
1 
2 
3 
4 
ROTES 
Federalism and Intergovernmental Relations (IGR) are 
presented as a single theory for the purposes of this 
thesis. Federalism provides the structural outline of 
the levels of American government. IGR describes the 
types of communication, focusing upon the two main 
linear flows - vertical and horizontal, between levels 
of government. The two combined provide a relatively 
clear guide for evaluating and discussing governmental 
relationships. 
The landmark works of Elazar, Wright, and Osborne are the 
focus of my review. The authors and these specific 
books are widely cited by other writers within the 
field of Public Administration. The reviewed books 
form the foundation for other publications by their 
authors. 
The continuum of the frameworks of federalism is best 
visualized using a pen. The pen has two ends or 
extremes, a top and bottom. If we visualize the top 
end as the first framework, the state as a bureaucratic 
layer, we start to understand the continuum expressed 
by autonomy and federal intrusion. The criteria of 
autonomy demonstrates minimal state autonomy while 
federal intrusion is maximized. The second framework, 
the state as a federal ally, is somewhat in the middle 
of our fictitious pen. Some measure of state autonomy 
is present and federal intrusion is reduced. However, 
a balance or equality between the two criterion may not 
exist. The two frameworks are known and discussed 
within the literature of federalism. However, we 
failed to identify and define the bottom, or point, of 
our pen. This extreme, or end of our pen, is the 
subject of the thesis. As we pass along our imaginary 
pen from the top to the bottom, we see increasing state 
autonomy and decreasing federal intrusion. Once these 
two criterion reach the bottom of our pen, their values 
are reversed. State autonomy is maximized and federal 
intrusion is minimized. 
The book, Implementation Theory and Practice; Toward a 
Third Generation, by Goggin and et al is cited. I 
researched the book to determine why government 
establishes and implements programs with restrictions. 
Although the book discusses implementation theory, it 
is presented within the context of the existing system 
of interaction between the federal and lower levels of 
government. 
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Clear definitions of public versus private sectors are 
difficult to apply to actual cases. Every definition 
has weak points and exceptions. I do not expect mine 
to be exempt. However, for the purposes of this 
thesis, the public sector is defined as legislative, 
enforcement, and regulatory operations of state and 
local governments within the government itself or as 
relates to government services. The private sector 
embodies all activities and organizations which exist 
outside the government structure (e.g., private 
companies). 
The Supreme Court decision in National League of Cities 
v. Usury prevented federal intervention within the 
public sector operations of a state/local government. 
This was reversed by Garcia v. San Antonio Transit 
Authority. 
The term 'states', as used in the thesis, corresponds 
with the definition contained in the Occupational 
Safety and Health Act of 1970. The act defines state 
as "a State of he United States, the District of 
Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, American 
Samoa, Guam, and the Trust Territory of the Pacific 
Islands" (Public Law 91-596, 1970, Section 3(7)). 
An employer, for the purposes of this thesis, is a 
governmental department, commission, division, agency, 
or other government organization, with facilities 
and/or public sector employees. The term, as relates 
to the public sector, does not include private sector 
contractors operating on behalf of a public sector 
employer. 
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Appendix 1 
INTERVIEWS 
Position 
OSHA, Region 5, Litigation 
Enforcement Section; Chicago, 
Illinois. Solicitor. Interview: 
10 April 1991 (Telephone). 
OSHA, Region 5, Federal-State 
Operations Division; Chicago, 
Illinois. Assistant Regional 
Administrator (Acting). Interview: 
20 February 1992 (Telephone). 
IDOL, DSIE; Springfield, Illinois. 
Southern Region Area Manager. 
Interview: 18 February 1992 (Joint 
and in person with Janet Wright). 
OSHA, Directorate of Federal/State 
Operations, State Programs, 
Washington D.C. Program Analyst. 
Interviews: 10 April 1991 and 
4 February 1992 (Telephone). 
IIC; Springfield, Illinois. Support 
Staff Member. No longer affiliated 
with IIC. Interview: 26 September 
1991 (Telephone). 
IDOL, DSIE; Chicago, Illinois. 
Northern Region Area Manager. 
Interviews: 20 February 1991, 
9 April 1991, 10 April 1991, and 
6 February 1992 (Telephone). 
IDOL, DSIE; Springfield, Illinois. 
Administrative Assistant to the 
Division Manager. Interview: 
18 February 1992 (Joint and in person 
with Robert Nichols). 
NOTE: ainterviews conducted in 1991. The 1991 
questionnaire not included in Appendix 2. However, 
questions were similar. 
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Appendix 2 
INTERVIEW QUESTIONSa 
Respondent Information 
1. What is your formal relationship to OSH? 
2. What is the full title of your position? 
3. What is your function in the agency? 
4. How long have you been with the agency? 
5. What other positions have you had within the agency? 
6. Did you hold other jobs or positions before joining the 
agency? If so, what where they? 
7. What is your educational level? 
8. Have you received technical training for your position? 
If so, what and where? 
OSH Activity Specific Information - OSHA Representatives 
1. Is there a requirement for a state's public sector to 
follow OSHA of 1970? Is so, what is the requirement 
and what outlines the requirement? 
2. How would you characterize the Federal/State 
relationship: Directive, Partnership, Independent? 
Why? 
3. Not all states are OSHA Plan States. Could you explain 
why states would and would not wish to participate in 
the program? 
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4. Who administers OSHA within the private sector of non-
OSHA Plan States? Public Sector? 
5. Are there OSHA Plan States for the public sector alone? 
Which states? Why only the public sector? 
6. Are there OSHA Plan States for the private sector 
alone? Which states? Why only the private sector? 
7. In how many states does OSHA administer the private 
sector without state involvement? Public sector? Both 
sectors? 
8. How was OSH administered prior to OSHA of 1970? 
9. Illinois withdrew its request to become an OSHA Plan 
State. What can you relate regarding to the events 
leading to this action as pertains to your agency? 
10. Does OSHA administer OSH within the state of Illinois? 
Which sectors? 
11. Does OSHA provide the state of Illinois financial aid 
and assistance for OSH? What kind? 
12. The state of Illinois established the Division of 
Safety Inspection and Education within the Illinois 
Department of Labor. Does OSHA maintain relations with 
this agency? What kind? 
13. Does the Illinois Division of Safety Inspection and 
Education receive any form of financial assistance from 
OSHA? 
14. Does OSHA receive reports from the Illinois Division? 
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15. What is the authority of OSHA as relates to the 
activities and administration of the Illinois Division 
of Safety Inspection and Education? 
16. Has OSHA been reapproached by the state of Illinois 
about OSHA Plan State status? If so, how and when? 
17. How are reports of infractions handled when they are 
within the Illinois public sector? 
18. How credible is the public sector OSH program within 
Illinois? 
OSH Activity Specific Information - State Representatives 
1. Is there a requirement for a state's public sector to 
follow OSHA of 1970? Is so, what is the requirement 
and what outlines the requirement? 
2. How would you characterize the Federal/State 
relationship: Directive, Partnership, Independent? 
Why? 
4. How was OSH administered within Illinois prior to OSHA 
of 1970? What was the legislation? Agency(ies)? 
5. Illinois withdrew its request to become an OSHA Plan 
State. What can you relate regarding to the events 
leading up to this action? 
a. Why did Illinois initiate the proposal to become an 
OSHA Plan State? 
b. What benefits did the state expect? 
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c. How was the program to be administered? 
d. Which agency was responsible for OSH? 
e. Was the agency civil service/professional or was 
the leadership and personnel politically appointed? 
f. Why did Illinois take action to withdraw the 
application? 
6. Following the formal withdrawal of the Illinois 
proposal and until the establishment of the current 
public sector program; what transpired? 
a. What agency assumed responsibility over what 
sectors of the state's economy? 
b. How was OSH administered by the state agency? 
c. Was there a clear dividing line between state and 
federal jurisdictions? 
d. What was the character of the relationship between 
the state agency and OSHA? 
7. The Illinois Industrial Commission was legislatively 
responsible for OSH activities within the state: 
a. Upon what basis were !IC members selected? 
Political? 
b. What was the general background and qualifications 
of the !IC personnel? 
c. How credible was the !IC? 
d. How effective was the !IC? 
e. How was the role of the !IC in OSH perceived by the 
state political leadership? 
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8. In the case of Simpson v Industrial Commission (Martin 
Marietta Corporation, appellee), the Illinois Supreme 
Court recognized "the fact that the Illinois Industrial 
Commission "held that on June 30, 1975, its authority 
to enforce the Illinois Health and Safety Act was 
effectively preempted by the Federal Occupational 
Safety and Health Act." 
a. Was the IIC actively regulating the private sector? 
Public Sector? 
b. What impact did this decision make? 
c. How as the credibility of IIC and the Illinois OSH 
program affected? 
9. In October 1985, the state legislature revised the 
"Safety Inspection and Education Act" establishing DSIE 
within IDOL: 
a. What caused this revision? 
b. Who were the major proponents (groups and 
individuals)? 
c. Why was DSIE placed under IDOL? 
d. Upon what basis are DSIE members selected? 
Political? 
e. What is the general background and qualifications 
of DSIE personnel? 
f. What sector(s) of the state economy does DSIE have 
jurisdiction? 
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10. In 1985, AFSCME filed suit against IDOL and DSIE: 
a. Why was the suit filed? 
b. What was the intent of the state legislature 
regarding DSIE versus the interpretation of AFSCME 
and the court? 
c. What was the impact of this suit? 
11. Does OSHA administer OSH within the state of Illinois? 
Which sectors? 
12. Does the state of Illinois receive any financial aid 
and assistance from OSHA? What kind? 
13. Does the Illinois Division of Safety Inspection and 
Education receive any form of financial assistance from 
OSHA? 
14. How is DSIE funded? What budgetary process? 
15. How is financial oversight of DSIE accomplished? 
16. Does Illinois provide a public sector OSH program 
because of the possibility of withholding of federal 
assistance in other areas? 
17. Other than state legislation, is there any federal 
legislation requiring the state pursue a public sector 
program? 
18. Does the state feel the OSH Act of 1970 requires a 
state agency like DSIE for other than OSHA Plan States? 
19. Is DSIE required to follow or administer OSHA 
regulations and standards? 
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20. Where is the dividing line between the jurisdictions of 
OSHA and DSIE within Illinois? Do they overlap? 
21. If DSIE did not agree to an OSHA requirement and 
pursued its own policy, what would likely happen? 
22. How much autonomy does Illinois have to pursue its own 
OSH concerns? 
23. Why does DSIE so closely resemble OSHA? What function 
does this perform? 
24. Did the structure of DSIE result from federal direction 
or suggestions? As a response to federal concerns? 
25. Is the state able to change, delete, add, increase, 
decrease, or otherwise change OSHA 
regulations/standards to meet Illinois needs? 
26. Why does DSIE use OSHA standards and regulations? To 
what degree do these standards and regulations permeate 
the organization? 
27. Has DSIE attempted to develop its own standards and 
regulations? What occurred? 
28. What differences are there between the state and 
federal programs? 
29. Does the Illinois Division send reports to OSHA? 
30. How is the flow of information between OSHA and DSIE 
characterized? What type of information is exchanged? 
31. What is the authority of OSHA as relates to the 
activities and administration of the Illinois Division 
of Safety Inspection and Education? 
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32. If the OSHA intervened within Illinois' public sector, 
how would the state react? 
33. Has the state of Illinois reapproached OSHA about OSHA 
Plan State status? If so, how and when? 
34. How are reports of infractions handled when they are 
within the Illinois private sector? 
35. How are DSIE personnel selected and what background 
must they possess? 
36. How are DSIE personnel trained to perform their tasks? 
a. How is this training obtained? 
b. Who pays? 
c. Is DSIE required to send its personnel to the OSHA 
school? 
d. Is DSIE required to reciprocate in any manner for 
this training? 
37. How are local government OSH programs administered? 
a. Are there local government OSH administrators? 
b. Who performs inspections, education, and employee 
complaint investigations? 
c. How are inspection reports handled? Employee 
complaints? Education requests? 
d. Do the local governments provide any financial 
reimbursement to the state for DSIE activities 
within their jurisdictions? 
38. How does DSIE, or would DSIE, handle a private sector 
company's request for a consultation visit? 
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39. DSIE is authorized to levy fines upon employers if 
deemed necessary: 
a. What is the fine structure? 
b. How is a fine applied? Satisfied? Appealed? 
c. Does the fine increase with time for non-
compliance? 
d. Can other funds to a local government be withheld 
until compliance? What types of funds? 
e. Have fines been levied? For what and to whom? 
NOTE: aThe interviews were informal and permitted the 
respondent to respond to the depth each felt 
appropriate. Not all questions were asked of each 
respondent. Specific questions were extracted 
depending upon the agency and position of the 
individual. Often, the answer to one question 
precluded the necessity of asking other questions. 
This frequently occurred due to the breath and depth 
of the responses provided by the interviewees to 
questions asked early in the interviews. At the end 
of each interview, the respondent was encouraged to 
provide any additional information or insight they 
felt might be beneficial to my understanding of the 
topic and case. 
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